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THE TAXATION OF REINVESTED CORPORATE
EARNINGS
RICHARD L. DOERNBERG*
I. Introduction
As long as capital gains are favored with reduced tax rates, the
exhilaration of converting ordinary income into capital gains will
continue to motivate taxpayers. In the case of corporate earnings,
the invitation to convert is derived from the Internal Revenue
Code1 (I.R.C. or Code), which permits a shareholder capital gains
treatment upon the sale or redemption of stock at a gain.2 The
Code works its magic even when some or all of the value received
for the stock represents payment for corporate earnings that are
retained by the corporation and which would have commanded
dividend treatment to the shareholder had they been distributed
prior to disposition.
The dramatic difference between the tax bite of capital gains
and ordinary income has spawned a welter of statutory provisions
to discern whether a corporate distribution is, in fact, a dividend or
* Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. BA., Yale University,
1970; M.A.T., Wesleyan University, 1972; J.D., University of Connecticut, 1976; LL.M. New
York University, 1980.
1. LR.C. § 1-9031 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. Throughout this article, it is assumed that stock is a capital asset in the hands of a
shareholder. See LR.C. §§ 1221 (1981) (definition of capital assets), 302 (exchange treatment
for redemption), 1202 (capital gains treatment). See also id. §§ 331, 346 (liquidations).
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a payment entitled to capital gains treatment.3 For example, I.R.C.
section 302(b)(2) sets out a numerical safe harbor to insure capital
gains treatment if a corporation redeems a meaningful percentage
of a shareholder's stock.' Otherwise, dividend treatment may re-
sult.5 Sections 304 and 306 were enacted to prevent a bailout of
corporate earnings at a capital gains rate through a sale of stock by
a shareholder in a transaction that amounted to an unsuccessful
redemption under I.R.C. section 302.8 Congress enacted the accu-
mulated earnings and personal holding company tax provisions to
encourage corporations to make "sufficient" dividend distributions
rather than to permit shareholders to enjoy capital gains treatment
of "excess" reinvested earnings through redemption, sale, or
liquidation.7
In spite of these and other statutory nets,8 it is still far from
clear when distributions from corporations will constitute dividend
income and when capital gains treatment will result.9 The confu-
sion and uncertainty are all the more unsettling when economically
identical transactions result in dissimilar tax consequences, de-
pending on the chosen form. The following model highlights the
problem.
X Corporation (X Corp. or X) was formed by unrelated share-
holders A and B, each holding sixty shares of common stock (all of
X Corp.'s outstanding stock) with a basis of $100. X Corp. was
organized with assets of $2,400 which annually will produce $240 of
3. For a taxpayer who is in the 50% bracket, classification as a capital gain reduces the
tax burden to 20%. Id. § 1202.
4. Id. § 302(b)(2).
5. See id. § 302(d).
6. Section 304 addresses the "sale" of stock to a corporation affiliated with the issuer. See
generally Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions Through Related Cor-
porations, 22 TAx L. REv. 161 (1967). Section 306 addresses the preferred stock bailout
where the shareholder receives a nontaxable stock dividend of preferred stock, "sells" it at
capital gains rates, and then causes or observes the redemption of stock from the "pur-
chaser." See generally Lowe, Bailouts: Their Role in Corporate Planning, 30 TAx L. Rnv.
357 (1975).
7. See I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (accumulated earnings), 541-547 (personal holding company).
8. See, e.g., id. §§ 341 (collapsible corporations), 333(c) (ordinary income recognition in
certain liquidations), 318 (attribution rules).
9. Compare the I.R.S. position in Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971), with its position in Casner v. Commis-
sioner, 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971).
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earnings, capitalized at 10% by A and B. In addition, X Corp. has
$1,200 of cash representing earnings and profits accumulated since
its formation. Because A and B have investment opportunities for
the $1,200 earnings more fruitful than those available to X, X de-
cides to distribute the $1,200. At the same time B, for personal
reasons, needs $1,200 and is willing to reduce his ownership in X
Corp. to a 25 % interest. The following transactions are considered,
each of which results in X distributing $1,200, B receiving $1,200,
A increasing his ownership interest in X Corp. to 75%, and B re-
ducing his ownership in X Corp. from 50% to 25%.
Case 1 - X distributes $1,200 to B and 120 shares of X stock
worth $1,200 to A.
Case 2 - X redeems forty shares from B for $1,200.
Case 3 - X distributes $600 to A and $600 to B. A buys thirty
shares from B for $600.
Case 4 - B sells thirty shares to A for $900, and X then distrib-
utes $900 to A and $300 to B.
Case 5 - B sells fifteen shares to A for $450, and X then redeems
twenty shares from B for $600. X Corp. then makes a
distribution of $450 to A and $150 to B.
Under existing law, assuming the transactions in each case occur
in the same taxable year and are respected, the tax consequences
vary dramatically:
Case 1 - A and B each has $600 ordinary income on the distribu-
tion,10 reduces his basis to $0 and records a $500 capital
gain. A has a $1,200 stock basis in the stock received as
a dividend."'
10. Throughout this article, the dividenti exclusion provided by I.R.C. § 116 is ignored for
ease of analysis. Similarly, the impact of corporate taxes on valuation is not considered.
11. The distribution is governed by I.R.C. §§ 301 and 305(b)(2). Although I.R.C. §
301(c)(2) permits an offset in basis before capital gains treatment results, the provision is
silent concerning whether the newly acquired basis of the stock dividend under § 301(d) can
be applied. If the application were permissible, A would have no capital gain, but instead
would offset $600 of his $1,300 stock basis ($100 original basis and $1,200 by virtue of §
301(d)), leaving a $700 basis. However, I.R.C. § 301(c)(2) refers to the "adjusted basis of the
stock" (emphasis added) which, under § 301(a), appears to refer to the stock on which the
distribution was made, or, in this case, the original 60 shares. Cf. William H. Kinch, 1942
T.C.M. 42,613 (P-H) (distribution on common in excess of earnings triggered § 301(c)(3)
capital gain after common basis was reduced to $0, and could not be applied to reduce basis
of shareholder's preferred stock). See generally Note, Aggregation of Bases Under Sections
1982]
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Case 2 - B has a capital gain of $1,200 minus the basis of forty
shares ($66.67) or $1,133.33, and a basis of $33.33 in
the remaining twenty shares. A will have no tax
consequences."'
Case 3 - A and B each has $600 ordinary income on the distribu-
tion. B will have a $550 capital gain on the sale of one-
half of his shares to A and a basis in the remaining
shares of $50. A will have a total stock basis of $700.18
Case 4 - B has an $850 capital gain on the sale and $300 ordi-
nary income on the distribution, leaving a basis of $50
in his remaining shares. A will have $900 of ordinary
income on the distribution and a total stock basis of
$1,000.14
Case 5 - B has a $425 capital gain on the sale, a $566.67 capital
gain on the redemption, and a $150 dividend. B's basis
in his remaining X stock is $41.67. A will have a $450
dividend on the distribution, ending up with a total ba-
sis of $550 in his X stock."8
301(c)(2) and (3), 33 TAx LAWYER 937 (1980).
12. The redemption qualifies under I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) which allows B capital gains treat-
ment, including that portion of the gain attributable to his share of the earnings and profits.
Although I.I.C. § 305(b)(2) in conjunction with § 305(c) poses a threat to A (the
nonredeeming shareholder), it is clear that § 305(b) has no application to isolated redemp-
tions. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1969); Trees. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Exa. 10-
12, T.D. 7281, 1973-2 C.B. 92, 100-01. The logic behind this distinction has been called into
question. See Stone, Back to Fundamentals: Another Version of the Stock Dividend Saga,
79 COLUM. L. Rav. 898, 929 (1979). Although Professor Stone would not tax nonredeeming
shareholders on any redemption, proposed § 300 would tax all nonredeeming shareholders.
13. In Case 3, B can only offset one-half of his basis on the sale, whereas in Case 1, LR.C.
§ 301(c)(2) allows full offset of his basis on the distribution.
14. This formulation places B somewhere in between Case 1 (heavy ordinary income com-
ponent) and Case 2 (no ordinary income component), because even those sales proceeds
attributable to the earnings and profits underlying the stock value are given capital gains
treatment. As the recipient of the distribution covered by earnings and profits, A will have
dividend treatment under I.R.C. § 301 even though the earnings and profits were accumu-
lated prior to his acquisition. This "miracle of income without gain" has been ratified by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 171-72 (1921). See also Tress. Reg.
§ 1.61-9(c) T.D. 6500, 25 Fed. Reg. 11,402 (1960); Powell, Income From Corporate Divi-
dends, 35 HAxv. L. Rav. 363 (1922).
15. The redemption qualifies under I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) with the basis of the redeemed
stock equal to 20 shares -- 45 shares X $75 basis ($25 of the original $100 basis was allo-
cated to the stock sold) = $33.33. Following the redemption, the earnings and profits of X
Corp. will be reduced pursuant to I.R.C. § 312(e) and Rev. Rul. 79-376, 1979-2 C.B. 133.
Regardless of the portion of the $600 redemption price charged to the $1,200 of the earnings
and profits, sufficient earnings and profits will exist to cover the $600 distribution that fol-
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The rainbow of tax results in the cases considered above, all of
which conclude in an economically identical posture, stems prima-
rily from the Code's inconsistent treatment of earnings and profits.
When earnings and profits are distributed with respect to stock,
ordinary income treatment results.11 When earnings and profits are
distributed in a meaningful redemption of stock, capital gains
result.17
The inclusion of reinvested corporate earnings in the capital
gains computation runs counter to the general economic theory
that "the essential element in a capital gain or loss is its unex-
pected character."18 To illustrate, consider the purchase by A of a
piece of investment property, suitable'only for grazing, with a $100
fair market value. That value represents the market's discounting
of the expected returns on the property by the rate of interest and
by a rate reflecting the level of perceived risk.1' Accordingly, if the
expected return were $10 a year in perpetuity and the risk-ad-
justed discount rate were 10%, a $100 fair market value results.20
Now, as the property produces the expected rents of $10 a year,
lows the redemption.
16. See I.R.C. §§ 301, 316.
17. See id. §§ 302, 1222. Similarly, a sale of stock produces capital gains, assuming the
seller is not a dealer, even though part of the stock's value may be due to accumulated
earnings and profits.
18. L. SsLTzF, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATmFn OF CAPrrAL GAINs AND LOSSES 47
(1951). But see R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDuAL INcomz TAx 182 (1976).
19. L. SELTZER, supra note 18, at 54. See BRuDNn & CHnELsTEm, CORPORATE FINAN C
35-78 (1979); J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIL MANAGzMET AND POLICY 14-43 (1977).
20. The formula for determining the value of a perpetuity is PV = A/r, where PV -
present value, A = expected yearly earnings, and r = discount rate.
Present value can be derived from the formula
A A A
PV - + + ... r - (Equationl)
l+r (l+r)' (l+r)n
This formula determines the present value of an annual return of A for n years discounted
at r. Multiplying by (1+r), the formula becomes:
A A
PV(I+r) = A + - + (Equation2)
l+r (l+r)n l
Subtracting Equation 1 from Equation 2:
A
PV(l+r) - PV = A - (l+r)n
A
As n approaches infinity, - approaches 0. Therefore, as n approaches infinity.
(I+r)n
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those rents are treated as ordinary income.21 Suppose after one
year of rents the property is sold for $200, its fair market value.
The increase in value might be due to any number of factors. The
expected earnings might now be perceived to be $20 a year because
of decreased availability of competitive grazing land in the market
or increased demand for grazing land. There might be a change in
the discount rate. A fall in market interest rates increases the
value of a future stream of income and, accordingly, the present
value of the property.22 Perhaps the market now requires a lower
return to compensate an investor for uncertainties, and risks of
owning grazing property. All of these changes are "unexpected" be-
cause if they were foreseeable, the market would have reflected the
information in the price of the property when A purchased it. Ac-
cordingly, the increase in value is in a sense a windfall, and should
be treated as a capital gain.28
Suppose instead that A purchases stock in a new corporation for
$100, its fair market value based on expected earnings per share of
$10 and a 10% discount rate. If A receives a dividend of the $10 of
corporate earnings allocable to A's stock, the dividend will be ordi-
nary income.2 ' If instead, no dividend is paid and A sells his stock
after one year for $110, its fair market value, the gain will be a
capital gain even though the $10 appreciation may be due to the
expected corporate earnings that actually were earned rather than
to any change in future expected earnings or the discount rate.
The transmutation of reinvested corporate earnings into capital
gains is a central feature of the American tax system, although jus-
tification of such a transmutation is not free from doubt.25 A num-
PVr = A
A
PV = -
r
21. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(5); L. SiTZER, supra note 18, at 3.
22. If the expected returns remain at $10 per year and the discount rate drops to 5%, the
present value equals $200. See supra note 20.
23. See Chirelstein, Fruit-Tree and the Ordinary Income Base, 1 U. OF BRIDGEPORT L.
Rzv. 1, 4 (1980).
24. See LR.C. § 61(a)(7).
25. See L. SELTzErz, supra note 18, at 11; Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains
Taxation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 985, 1011-13 (1956). Even capital gains taxation can be avoided
where, upon death, stock receives a stepped-up basis under I.R.C. § 1014 to a fair market
value that reflects reinvested earnings. See, R. GOODE, THE INDvmuAL INcoME TAx 190
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ber of commentators have concluded that special treatment for any
capital gains is unwarranted. If so, elimination of reinvested corpo-
rate earnings from the capital gains base represents a step in the
right direction."6
Although some concern exists that increased taxation of capital
gains will increase the "lock in" effect, the conclusion remains sub-
stantially unproven and may be overstated.27 Indeed, ordinary in-
come treatment of reinvested corporate earnings recognized on a
sale or redemption might result in conflicting tendencies. On one
hand, the prospect of an ordinary income component may cause
some investors to hold on to their investments until death, at
which time I.R.C. section 1014 provides a step-up in basis.'8 On the
other hand, investors no longer will have the same incentive to
postpone transactions to convert ordinary income into capital
gains, because earnings and profits under all circumstances will be
taxed as ordinary income. In fact, to the extent that an investor
chooses to or must sell his stock during his lifetime, ordinary in-
(1976).
26. For example, commentators have noted that full taxation of capital gains is likely to
increase progressivity of the tax system. R. GOODE, supra note 25, at 192-93; J. PECMAN,
COMPREHENsIE INcoME TAXATION 144 (1977). Moreover, there is likely to be little effect on
total savings. J. PECHMAN, supra at 142-43. With the increased revenue that would be pro-
duced by full taxation, the tax rates might be lowered. G. BRAK & J. PECHmAN, FEDERAL
TAX REroRM 52 (1975); J. PEcHmAN, supra at 151.
27. The "lock-in" effect is the reluctance of investors to change their portfolios because to
do so causes an avoidable tax liability. An investment switch will be advantageous if r [IM -
tc(M-C)] > rM, where M is the current market value of the old asset, C is its cost or
other basis, tc is the marginal rate of tax on realized capital gains, and r1 and r. respectively
are the ratios of the expected return to current value of the old asset and the new asset. R.
GOODE, supra note 25, at 197-200. See Beazer, Expected Income Changes and the Lock-In
Effect of the Capital Gains Tax, 19 NAT'L TAX J. 308 (1966) (refining Goode's formula).
Although Goode concludes that locking-in would be increased if tax rates on capital gains
were increased without changing the realization rules, others have reached different conclu-
sions. Cf. Beazer, supra at 318; Holt & Shelton, The Lock-In Effect of the Capital Gains
Tax, 15 NAT. TAx J. 337, 351 (1962); Sprinkel & West, Effects of Capital Gains Taxes on
Investment Decisions, 35 J. Bus. 122, 132 (1962). Compare R. GoODE, supra note 25, at 204
and Somers, Capital Gains Tax: Significance of Changes in Holding Period and Long Term
Rate, 16 VAND. L. REv. 509, 532 (1963) with R. GOODE, supra note 25, at 205.
28. Note, however, that LR.C. § 1014 does not affect a corporation's earnings and profits
account. Therefore, the heirs of the stockholder would still have an ordinary income compo-
nent if their stock were sold at a gain. Although beyond the scope of this article, the incen-
tive to lock-in stock investments might be eliminated by amending the Code to provide for
recognition of a ratable share of accumulated earnings and profits on the death of an
investor.
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come treatment of reinvested earnings provides an incentive for
early disposition to prevent bunching of income even though the
income averaging provision of I.R.C. section 1301 may offer some
relief. Moreover, for the same reason, investors have an incentive
to compel corporations to make current distributions of earnings
and profits rather than to retain them. 9 By taxing reinvested earn-
ings at ordinary income rates regardless of when and how a dispo-
sition of stock takes place, the treatment of stock would be
brought more into line with the treatment of other capital assets in
which conversion of ordinary earnings into capital gains is less
likely to occur.
The concept of applying the corporate distribution pattern of
I.R.C. section 301 to sales and redemptions has been considered
before, but has drawn fire from those who recoil at a new layer of
complexity in the tax laws.3 0 Nevertheless, the present system has
engendered complexities and inequities of its own. For example,
I.R.C. section 302 labors mightily to determine when a redemption
is "essentially equivalent to a dividend" or deserves capital gains
treatment, focusing primarily on the percentage of equity surren-
dered. Other Code sections seek to shore up other weaknesses in
29. Similar conflicting motivations for investors are considered in connection with in-
creasing the holding period for capital gains treatment. Somers, supra note 27, at 533. The
effects of inflation and rising tax rates on the decision to hold or sell securities is considered
in Beazer, supra note 27.
To the extent that corporations can be induced to make current income distributions so
that investors, without having to consider the capital gains-ordinary income differential, can
determine whether to reinvest or make competing investments, misallocations might be
eliminated. See BREALEY, SEcusurY PRIcEs IN A Comp.rr MARKET 20-21 (1971); R.
GOODE, supra note 25, at 197 ("Many economists argue that capital will be most efficiently
allocated if profits are distributed and individual shareholders are allowed to decide whether
they should be reinvested where earned or placed elsewhere"); J. PECHMAN, supra note 26,
at 151; R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 237 (1972).
30. See, e.g., Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolu-
tion and Reform, 87 YAm L. J. 90, 107-17, 149-51 (1977). Professor Clark, in describing one
of the "seven basic decisions" of contemporary corporate tax law, notes that "shareholder
dispositions of stock are presumptively to be treated purely as dispositions of capital assets,
that is, independently of corporate-level events." Id. at 107. Citing the complexities of allo-
cating earnings and profits to individual shares, Professor Clark concludes that efficient cap-
ital markets and administrative reality demand this "corporate veil" principle. Id. at 151.
For another approach to the reinvested earnings problem, see O'Kelley, Corporate Distri-
butions and the Income Tax: A Consideration of the Inconsistency Between Subchapter C
and Its Underlying Policy, 34 VArD. L. Rzv. 1 (1981).
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the redemption structure.31 The economic resources and the con-
torted legal reasoning involved in determining whether various
"bailout" transactions transform ordinary income to capital gains
also have been significant.3 2 Whether elimination of the corporate
veil principle would create more complexity than it would clear up
is conjectural. This Article will propose a statutory framework that
theoretically will clear away some of the existing complexity and
incongruity.
Briefly, the purpose of this proposed framework is to offer a tax-
neutral system to shareholders who receive payments in connection
with their stock whether those payments originate from transac-
tions normally considered dividends, redemptions, or sales. To
function, the system must force shareholders to recognize ordinary
income on any payment in connection with their stock to the ex-
tent of a ratable share of earnings and profits. Before discussing
the proposed framework in detail and examining its application to
the hypothetical cases discussed above, it is necessary to state the
assumptions underlying the framework and to indicate the scope of
the Article.
A basic assumption underlying the proposal is that to the extent
possible, identical economic results should dictate identical tax re-
sults. Aside from its logical ring, this principle has been embraced
by Congress in a variety of circumstances. For example, I.R.C. sec-
tion 337, the anti-Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.3 8 provision,
was enacted to produce similar tax results in a liquidation setting
whether a sale of assets was made by the liquidating corporation or
its shareholders. I.R.C. section 334(b)(2) was enacted to equalize
the tax treatment when a corporation directly purchases assets of
another corporation and when it purchases stock for purposes of
liquidating the corporation.
The framework proposed in this Article does not purport to
eliminate the difference in treatment between capital gains and or-
dinary income in most respects. Thus, when the increase in the
value of an asset is due to perceived increased earnings potential or
31. See, supra note 6.
32. See Clark, supra note 30, at 113-16. See also B. BrrrKER & J. EusrxcE, FE ERAL IN-
coME TAxATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHoLSm 1U 7.07, 9.25 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as BrrrKEn & EUSTICE].
33. 324 U.S. 331 (1944).
1982]
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a change in the discount rate, capital gains treatment is assumed
appropriate. When the increase is due to reinvested earnings, how-
ever, ordinary income treatment is proposed. The proposal does
not address other issues related to capital gains taxation such as
the full integration of corporate and individual income taxliabilities."
Several other bulwarks of the tax system are not scrutinized.3 5
The step-up in basis provided in I.R.C. section 1014, which also
enhances the appeal of reinvested earnings, is unchallenged. The
concept of realization central to the American tax system would
remain largely intact; an individual investor would not be taxed
when a corporation initially earns income." In keeping with Eisner
v. Macomber,7 no tax would lie when a corporation makes a pro
rata distribution of its own stock."' An investor may not offset any
nonstock distributions with the decrease in the value of his ex-
isting stock, nor may he realize such a decrease on corporate distri-
butions to other shareholders. Under the proposed framework,
however, any change in the value of an investor's stock resulting
from a redemption of the shares of other investors is realized.3 9
The differences in treatment between debt and equity are ac-
cepted.4 0 Accordingly, debt ownership is ignored in calculating pro-
34. See generally G. BRAK & J. PECHMAN, supra note 26, at 44-52; J. PECHMAN, supra
note 26, at 116-62.
35. See generally Clark, supra note 30.
36. This is in keeping with the dual system of taxation whereby corporations and share-
holders are separately taxed. For suggested reforms in this area, see Warren, Integration of
Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, FEzRAL INcoME TAX SIMPLFCATION 313 (Gustaf-
son ed. 1979).
37. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
38. Id. at 208-19.
39. Under existing law, I.R.C. § 305(c) and § 305(b)(2) provide for constructive realization
where a shareholder's proportionate ownership interest increases. Section 305(c), however,
applies only to redemptions that under § 302(d) are treated under § 301, and the regulations
further narrow the constructive realization concept to redemptions under § 301 that are not
isolated. Tress. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Exs. 10, 11, T.D. 7281, 1973-2 C.B. 92. The proposed
framework expands this realization concept to all redemptions.
40. Paradoxically, a stock distribution to a sole shareholder is not taxable under Eisner v.
Macomber, supra note 37, while a distribution of a corporate note to a sole shareholder is
taxable under Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947). In each case, the shareholder
merely has recharacterized his interest in the corporation. See LR.C. § 385 and the proposed
regulations thereunder. See generally Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Cor-
porate Debt: A Critical Analysis And A Proposal, 26 TAX L. Rav. 369 (1971).
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portionate changes in a shareholder's participation in a
corporation.
Other unchallenged concepts include the use of earnings and
profits as a measure of dividend income,41 the maintenance of the
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering42 principle that
distributions in kind generally do not produce tax consequences at
the corporate level,43 and the exclusions and deductions allowed by
I.R.C. sections 116 and 243 to 245.
For the most part, the Article will focus on operating distribu-
tions by a corporation with only summary consideration of the liq-
uidation and reorganization provisions. Also, the analysis focuses
on individual shareholders, recognizing that existing provisions
designed to deal with corporate shareholders might be adapted
with little problem."
With these assumptions in mind, the Article turns to the pro-
posed statutory framework for corporate distributions, referred to
as proposed section 300.45 Proposed section 300 consolidates ex-
isting I.R.C. sections 301, 302, 305, and 306, while impacting on
several other Code provisions including those addressing liquida-
tion, collapsible corporations, and the treatment of boot in
reorganization.
II. THE OPERATION OF PROPOSED SECTION 300
The heart of proposed section 300 lies in the recognition of an
ordinary income component as measured by earnings and profits
on sales and redemptions. To quantify that component and to en-
sure that identical economic consequences generate identical tax
consequences, proposed section 300 recharacterizes stock transfers
in the following manner. First, proposed section 300 treats a corpo-
41. For a reexamination of the earnings and profits principle, see Blum, The Earnings
and Profits Limitation on Dividend Income: A Reappraisal, 53 TAXES 68 (1975). The analy-
sis under proposed § 300 assumes the "nimble dividend" concept of I.R.C. § 316(a)(2) is
removed. The outdated origin of the concept is explained in Bittker & Eustice, supra note
32, at 7.02.
42. 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
43. Clark, supra note 30, at 130-35.
44. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 301(b)(1)(B), (d)(2).
45. Proposed § 300 does not in its present form aspire to statutory precision, but is in-
tended solely as a framework. See Appendix.
1982]
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rate payment in redemption as a pro rata distribution to both
redeeming and appropriate nonredeeming shareholders who must
account for the distributions as they would any corporate distribu-
tion unconnected to a redemption. Then, the nonredeeming share-
holders make contributions to capital in the amount of their
deemed distributions which simultaneously are distributed to the
redeeming shareholders in exchange for their shares. There will be
further gain or loss recognized to the redeeming shareholders on
this aspect of the analysis. The reason for these contortions is to
take into account the benefit that accrues to certain nonredeeming
shareholders from a redemption. Dividend treatment can result to
the extent that a nonredeeming shareholder has increased his eq-
uity interest in the corporation relative to other shareholders.45
Second, proposed section 300 recharacterizes stock transfers by
treating a sale or exchange by a shareholder as the simultaneous
closing of a corporate account by the seller and opening of an ac-
count by the purchaser. In closing the account, the seller must ac-
count for his share of earnings and profits. Accordingly, a sale or
exchange is treated as a simultaneous redemption of the seller's
shares and purchase of those shares from the corporation. On the
deemed redemption, the seller will account for his share of earn-
ings and profits as ordinary income.
Another integral part of proposed section 300 is its emphasis on
quantity of stock ownership rather than quality. The market value
of stock determines the tax effects on a redemption or stock distri-
bution, regardless of any preferences or voting rights. In this man-
ner, proposed section 300 rejects qualitative judgments like those
in I.R.C. sections 305, 302(b)(2), and 306 in favor of the fair mar-
ket value concept illustrated in section 542(a)(2). Proposed section
300 takes the position that the fair market value of stock will re-
flect market assessment of its qualitative features.
46. Professor Blum has defined a dividend as "an occurrence that entails a transfer, direct
or indirect, of something of value from the corporation to a shareholder without substan-
tially reducing the equity interest of that shareholder vis-a-vis other owners of the equity."
Blum, Drawing the Line Between Dividends and Investment Adjustments: A Proposal for
More Consistency, 55 TAXES 30, 31 (1977). A nonredeeming shareholder can dispose of a
portion of his equity without lessening his equity interest in the corporation. For example, if
A and B each owns 60 shares of X Corp. stock, and X Corp. redeems 40 shares from B, A
can sell 20 shares without lowering his 50% equity interest in the corporation.
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A. Proposed Section 300
PROPOSED SECTION 300(1).
The term "distribution" means a payment of property with re-
spect to or in redemption of the corporation's stock.
Under the proposal, all corporate payments in connection with
stock will be treated similarly.
PROPOSED SECTION 300(2).
The term "'property" includes money, securities, and stock in
the corporation making the distribution, or rights to acquire such
stock.
This definition differs from existing I.R.C. section 317(a) by in-
cluding a distributing corporation's own stock and stock rights as
property subject to the distribution rules. Under present law,
stock, although not directly considered "property" for purposes of
I.R.C. section 301, achieves constructive property status by virtue
of section 305(b).
PROPOSED SECTION 300(3).
The term "redemption" means the acquisition by a corporation
of its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property, whether
the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or held as treasury
stock.
This merely is a restatement of existing I.R.C. section 317(b).
PROPOSED SECTION 300(4).
Any actual distribution with respect to a class of stock is
deemed to be pro rata to the shareholders holding such stock. Any
actual distribution in redemption of a class of stock is deemed to
be pro rata to the shareholders holding such stock or a less pre-
ferred class of stock to the extent that the value of such share-
holders' stock increases as a result of the surrender of shares. Dis-
tributions of the distributing corporation's own stock shall have
no tax consequences unless the distribution increases the propor-
tionate interests of the receiving shareholders in the assets or
earnings and profits of the corporation.
The pro rata distribution rule as applied to nonredemption dis-
tributions should not cause problems, because shareholders of any
class of stock presumably will receive pro rata distributions. Under
the proposal, however, not only the amounts but the quality of the
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distributions will be deemed to be pro rata, with any actual differ-
ences in the quality of the property received accomplished through
deemed inter-shareholder transfers.
The rule as applied to redemptions is the first step in recogniz-
ing that economically a redemption is indistinguishable from a pro
rata distribution followed by a sale from the "redeemed" to the
remaining shareholders 4  or a stock dividend to the remaining
shareholders and a cash dividend to the "redeemed. '49
The third sentence of proposed section 300(4) focuses on some of
the problems currently addressed in I.R.C. section 305. The propo-
sal differs from current law in recognizing that the only stock divi-
dends that should be taxable are those that give the receiving
shareholder a disproportionate increase in the distributing corpo-
ration relative to the nonreceiving shareholders. This proportional-
ity test differs from the test developed by the Supreme Court and
Congress in that the quality of the stock received, preferred or
common, is irrelevant in determining tax consequences. Instead,
market value and its effect on existing stock value alone will deter-
mine taxability.50
PROPOSED SECTION 300(5).
Any transfer of stock by sale or exchange shall be treated as a
47. For example, if A and B are the only shareholders of X Corp., and A receives a $1,200
distribution and B receives a stock distribution of 120 shares of X Corp. worth $1,200, pro-
posed § 300 would treat each as receiving $600 and 60 shares of X stock followed by a sale
from A to B of 60 shares for $600.
48. See Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repur-
chase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 749 (1969).
49. In a situation in which there are multiple classes of stock outstanding (e.g., preferred
and common), the redemption of shares from the preferred class is likely to increase (or at
least not decrease) the value of the common shares outstanding. Therefore, a pro rata distri-
bution should be deemed made to the common shareholders who then contribute the
deemed distribution to capital to redeem the preferred shares. See Donaldson, In Defense of
Preferred Stock, 40 HARV. Bus. RaV. 123, 129-30 (1962). For a discussion of preferred stock
redemptions see infra pp. 23-25.
50. For a discussion ofthe development of the proportionate interest test, see Del Cotto
& Wolf, The Proportionate Interest Test of Section 305 and the Supreme Court, 27 TAx L.
REv. 49 (1971). The authors note that the Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S.
238 (1937) (preferred on common with preferred outstanding) and Koshland v. Helvering,
298 U.S. 441 (1936) (common on preferred with common outstanding), found taxability
where a different kind of stock interest was distributed. However, in Helvering v. Sprouse,
318 U.S. 604 (1943) (pro rata distribution of nonvoting common on both voting and nonvot-
ing common) and Strassburger v. Commissioner, 318 U.S. 604, 607 (1943) (pro rata distribu-
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redemption and a simultaneous purchase from the corporation.
Any transfer of stock by redemption shall be treated as a redemp-
tion and a simultaneous contribution to capital of the corporation
by the remaining shareholders both in the amount of the deemed
distribution.
While proposed section 300(4) prescribes the treatment of share-
holders with respect to corporate distributions, proposed section
300(5) focuses on the treatment of shareholders when they transfer
their stock either in connection with or apart from a corporate dis-
tribution. To assure equal tax treatment whether the transfer is in
the form of a sale or a redemption, all transfers are treated as re-
demptions simultaneously linked to a purchase from the corpora-
tion in the case of a sale, or a contribution to capital in the case of
a redemption. In the case of a redemption, the contribution will be
equal to the deemed distribution resulting from proposed section
300(4). By recasting all transfers as redemptions, proposed section
300(5) assures uniform treatment and, in conjunction with pro-
posed section 300(6), guarantees that any receipt from the transfer
of stock will carry with it ordinary income treatment to the extent
of the ratable share of earnings and profits, because in either a sale
or redemption, a portion of a stock's fair market value may be due
to the corporation's retained earnings and profits.
PROPOSED SECTION 300(6).
On any distribution, a shareholder shall treat as ordinary in-
come any proceeds to the extent of his ratable share of earnings
and profits. On any transfer by sale, exchange, or redemption, a
shareholder shall treat as ordinary income any proceeds to the
extent of his ratable share of earnings and profits attributable to
the stock transferred.
Proposed section 300(6) causes shareholders to recognize as ordi-
nary income a ratable share of earnings and profits, regardless of
the form of the transaction, whenever a shareholder receives or is
deemed to receive property that reflects a corporation's earnings
tion of preferred on common), the Court emphasized the need for a change in proportional-
ity as well. While I.R.C. § 305(b)(2) attempts to adopt the notion of proportionate change as
a prerequisite for taxability of certain stock dividends, I.R.C. §§ 305(b)(3) and (4) focus
solely on the nature of the stock interest distributed and on which the distribution is made.
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and profits."' A shareholder's ratable share of earnings and profits
for purposes of measuring ordinary income on a distribution is de-
termined in proposed section 300(9). When a stock transfer is in-
volved, proposed section 300(10) limits a shareholder's ratable
share of earnings and profits to the portion attributable to the
stock transferred.52
The interplay of proposed sections 300(4), (5), (6), (9), and (10)
is illustrated best by a redemption. The initial payment by a cor-
poration in redemption is characterized as a pro rata distribution
by section 300(4). Each shareholder must report ordinary income
on the distribution in accordance with the first sentence of section
300(6) to the extent of his ratable share of earnings and profits as
determined by section 300(9). Having analyzed the distribution as-
pect of the transaction, proposed section 300 focuses on the re-
demption aspect. The second sentence of section 300(5) character-
izes the redemption, while the second sentence of section 300(6)
along with section 300(10) outline the ordinary income component
of the redemption aspect.
PROPOSED SECTION 300(7).
Any amounts distributed in excess of a shareholder's ratable
share of earnings and profits shall first be applied against a
shareholder's basis in his stock (but not in excess of basis alloca-
ble to any stock transferred), and then be treated as gain from
the sale or exchange of property.
Proposed section 300(7), in conjunction with proposed section
300(6), puts into place the taxing regime of existing I.R.C. section
301(c) under which distributions are applied first against earnings
51. Proposed § 300(4), which taxes distributions based on a ratable share of earnings and
profits, is like I.R.C. §§ 356(a)(2), 333, and 306 under existing law. I.R.C. § 316 does not on
its face limit taxability to a ratable share if a distribution is "out of" earnings and profits.
52. Proposed § 300(6) requires a shareholder to recognize the ordinary income component
on a transfer even if the transfer is at a loss. To illustrate: A, sole and original owner of X
Corp., holds stock with a $2,000 basis and a $1,500 fair market value. X Corp. has assets
consisting of $500 of earnings and profits, and $1,000 in working capital. If A sells his stock
for $1,500, proposed § 300(6) will require the recognition of $500 in ordinary income. The
$1,000 unreturned basis under proposed § 300(7) can be deducted as a $1,000 capital loss.
Regardless of what has happened to A's original capital, he has received $500 on the sale
representing X's earnings, and he should be taxed on that amount. Capital loss treatment is
appropriate because the original $2,000 capital contribution has diminished in value to
$1,000.
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and profits, next against basis, and finally treated as capital gains.
These layers apply to actual distributions and deemed distribu-
tions under the pro rata rule of proposed section 300(4) and the
transfer rule of proposed section 300(5).
PROPOSED SECTION 300(8).
In determining gain on a transfer, the basis of stock transferred
equals the product of a shareholder's basis in the class of stock
transferred and the percentage decrease in the shareholder's
stock ownership of that class as a result of the transfer.
This provision does not affect existing law with respect to alloca-
tion of basis on any sales transaction." If a shareholder sells one-
half of his stock, one-half of his basis is allocable to the stock sold.
Proposed section 300(8) recognizes, however, that a sale of X com-
mon shares has far different consequences than a redemption of X
common shares in terms of the shareholder's continuing invest-
ment in the corporation, and that basis allocation should reflect
this difference. For example, if A owns sixty of the 120 common
shares outstanding and sells thirty shares, one-half of his basis in
the sixty shares should offset the sales proceeds because A's invest-
ment in the common stock has been halved from 50% to 25%
(thirty out of 120 shares outstanding). If, however, X redeems
thirty shares from A, his interest in the common stock declines
from 50% to 33.33% (thirty out of ninety shares outstanding). Re-
gardless of the number of shares actually surrendered, A's percent-
age of ownership has declined only 33.33%." Accordingly, the ba-
sis recovery should be limited to 33.33% of A's original basis in the
sixty shares. Proposed section 300(8) simply recognizes that A, by
redeeming thirty shares, is in no different an ownership position
53. Proposed § 300(8) is not intended to prevent a shareholder from selling or redeeming
a specific block of stock with a specific basis as is permitted under existing law. See, e.g.,
Lakeside Irrigation Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
666 (1942). In such a case, the specific block of stock should be treated as a class of stock for
purposes of proposed § 300(8).
54. The measure of changes in ownership for purposes of proposed § 300 is the fair mar-
ket value of stock held. When only one class of stock is outstanding, the percentage decrease
in the stock ownership serves as the same measure. Thus, A's decrease in stock ownership
can be expressed by the following ratio:
16.67% decline in percentage ownership
50% original ownership
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than had he sold twenty shares leaving him with 33.33% of the
outstanding shares (forty out of 120). Because only one-third of A's
total basis would be allocable to a sale of twenty shares, the same
result should follow on a redemption of thirty shares.
PROPOSED SECTION 300(9).
A shareholder's ratable share of earnings and profits equals the
sum for all years of the product of the current earnings and prof-
its allocable to any class of stock on which a distribution is made
and the shareholder's percentage of stock ownership of such class
on January 1 of the year.5
The determination of ratable earnings and profits is complicated
by at least two factors. First, the allocation of earnings and profits
to different classes of stock is speculative, although the Code in its
present form requires such an allocation upon a sale or exchange of
stock in certain foreign corporations pursuant to I.R.C. section
1248(a).5 ' Second, newly acquired stock ownership by actual
purchase or constructive acquisition through redemption of other
shareholder's holdings cannot be counted in determining a share-
holder's ratable share of previously earned earnings and profits.
This follows logically from the fact that the newly acquired stock's
share of previously earned earnings and profits was taken into ac-
count upon either the redemption or sale in accordance with pro-
posed section 300(6). Proposed section 300(9) meets this problem
by focusing on earnings and profits accumulated after stock is
acquired.
One of the benefits of proposed section 300(9) is the elimination
of the miracle of income without gain when a purchaser of stock,
who receives a distribution from accumulated earnings and profits
the day after the purchase, has dividend income.57 Proposed sec-
tions 300(4) to (6) require immediate recognition of ordinary gain
55. Because earnings and profits are determined at the end of a year to evaluate the qual-
ity of distributions made during that year, see I.R.C. § 316(a)(2), the transferor of stock
must account for current earnings and profits accumulated after, but in the same year as,
the transfer. The transferee, or constructive transferee in the case of a nonredeeming share-
holder, must account for earnings and profits in the year after acquisition.
56. See Tress. Reg. §§ 1.1248-2, -3, T.D. 6779, 1965-1 C.B. 383, amended by T.D. 7293,
1973-2 C.B. 228 and Tress. Reg. §§ 1.951-1(e)(2), (3) (1965).
57. See Rev. Rul. 56-211, 1956-1 C.B. 155 (illustrating income without gain). See also
supra note 14.
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to the extent of earnings and profits on any sale so that any subse-
quent distribution to the purchaser in the absence of newly earned
earnings and profits will represent a return of basis pursuant to
proposed section 300(7).
PROPOSED SECTION 300(10).
The term "ratable share of earnings and profits attributable to
the stock transferred" means the product of the shareholder's rat-
able share of earnings and profits and the percentage decrease in
the shareholder's stock ownership in the class of stock transferred
as a result of the transfer.
Proposed section 300(10) defines a term used in the second sen-
tence of proposed section 300(6). The purpose of the term is to
limit the ordinary income potential in a transfer situation to earn-
ings and profits attributable to the stock transferred rather than a
shareholder's total share of earnings and profits. Proposed section
300(10) is not intended to prevent a shareholder from selling or
redeeming a specific block of stock which may not be as ripe with
earnings and profits as other blocks. If the shareholder can prove
the actual earnings and profits allocable to the block transferred,
he should not be bound by the formula in proposed section
300(10).5
B. Application of Proposed Section 300: Common Stock
With proposed section 300 set out, the problem offered above59
yields identical tax treatment regardless of the method used to
reach the end result. To briefly restate the example: X Corp., with
original shareholders A and B each holding sixty shares of common
stock with a basis of $100, was formed with $2,400 in assets and
has earned $1,200 which is available for distribution. A variety of
transactions are considered by which A increases his ownership in-
terest to 75%, X Corp. distributes $1,200, and B receives $1,200
while decreasing his ownership percentage to 25%.
Case 1-X distributes $1,200 to B and 120 shares of X stock,
worth $1,200, to A.
58. See, e.g., Lakeside Irrigation Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 53; Rev. RuL 76-377,
1976-2 C.B. 89.
59. See discussion supra p. 3.
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Under both existing law and the proposal, A and B each has
$600 of ordinary income. The difference in approach between ex-
isting law and proposed section 300 with respect to B lies in the
capital gains component. I.R.C. section 301(c)(2) permits B to off-
set his entire basis upon receiving $600 in excess of his share of
earnings and profits; therefore, under I.R.C. section 301(c)(3), B
receives a $500 capital gain. Under proposed section 300, B ends
up with a $550 capital gain and a $50 basis. As to A, proposed
section 300 removes the $500 capital gain that would be recognized
under I.R.C. section 301, while leaving A with a $700 basis.
Proposed section 300(4) deems that A and B each receives a dis-
tribution of $600 and sixty shares. As equal shareholders, they
should be entitled not only to the same amount but the same qual-
ity of distribution. The pro rata distribution of sixty shares to A
and B fosters no tax consequences pursuant to the last sentence of
proposed section 300(4). In accordance with existing I.R.C. section
307, A and B each allocates $50 of basis to the new shares. Pro-
posed sections 300(6) and (9) require A and B each to report $600,
his ratable share of earnings and profits, on the distribution of
cash as ordinary income. To get from the hypothetical distribution
to the actual result, A is deemed to purchase B's sixty shares for
$600 which, pursuant to proposed sections 300(5) and (7), results
in a $550 capital gain to B who retains a $50 basis in his remaining
sixty shares. A has a total basis in his 180 shares of $700 ($100
original basis plus $600 cost basis). The effect of the proposal in
Case 1 is to conform the events to those in Case 3.
Case 2-X redeems forty shares from B for $1,200.
Although existing I.R.C. section 302(b)(2) gives B a capital gain
of $1,133.33 ($1,200-$66.67 basis), proposed section 300 gives a
tax result identical to that in Case 1. Under the proposal, not only
is B taxed on ordinary income to the extent of his ratable share of
earnings and profits, but A is taxed to the extent that the fair mar-
ket value of his stock increased due to B's surrender of stock.60
60. One would expect a straight distribution of $1,200 to decrease the fair market value of
A's stock from $30 per share to $20 per share. Because B surrenders 40 shares in exchange
for the $1,200, A's stock continues to be valued at $30 per share. A has realized a $10 per
share benefit, or $600, resulting from B's surrender of shares.
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Although A does not actually receive a distribution, his position
after the redemption is the same as if he had received a cash distri-
bution and purchased one-half of B's 50% interest.61 To provide
tax liability for A in Case 2, as in Case 1, is to create a cash obliga-
tion without any income. A is in a position after B's redemption,
however, to sell twenty shares for their $600 fair market value at
no gain without diluting his original participation in the corpora-
tion. After the sale, A would own forty out of eighty shares out-
standing.6 2 The opportunity to sell in a public corporation presents
no problem. In a closely held corporation, potential shareholders
presumably would become more responsive to those investment
opportunities that met the needs of nonredeeming shareholders for
cash to pay taxes. The notion of tax liability without cash is not
foreign to the Code in its present form. For example, a stock divi-
dend falling within I.R.C. section 305(b)(2), or any other part of
section 305(b), causes the same problems and is no different in ec-
onomiic result than a redemption.63
Proposed section 300 is applied to Case 2 by analyzing first the
distribution and then the surrender of shares. First, proposed sec-
tion 300(4) renders the $1,200 distribution pro rata, $600 to each A
and B. Second, proposed sections 300(6) and (9) tax A and B each
on $600 ordinary income. Third, proposed section 300(5) focuses
on the redemption element by deeming A to have contributed his
$600 to the capital of X Corp., thereby increasing his basis in X
Corp. stock from $100 to $700." X Corp. is then deemed to have
redeemed B's forty shares for the same $600. Fourth, although
under existing law the basis of the forty shares redeemed would be
61. See infra Case 3. See also Chirelstein, supra note 48.
62. Under proposed § 300(5), A, who has $600 of ordinary income on B's redemption,
increases his basis by $600 on the deemed contribution to capital. That increase is allocable
to the portion of A's 75% stock interest representing increased equity participation. One-
third of A's 75% interest arose as a result of B's redemption which increased A's participa-
tion by 25%. Accordingly, the $600 basis increase should be allocated to one-third of A's 60
shares, or 20 shares, while A's original 50% interest, or 40 shares, maintain their $100 basis.
When A sells his increased ownership for $600, there is no gain.
63. Compare Case 1 with Case 2. The solution in Case 1 is similar to that in Case 2. A can
sell 60 shares for $600 at no gain while maintaining a 50% interest in X.
64. See I.R.C. § 118 and Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1960), stating that such payments are "in
the nature of assessments upon, and represent an additional price paid for" the stock of the
corporation.
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$66.67 (40/60 x $100), proposed section 300(8) requires a different
basis allocation because B's redemption only reduces his ownership
percentage from 50% to 25%, or a 50% reduction. Immediately
following the deemed distribution and prior to the redemption, B's
stock has a $1,200 fair market value. After the redemption, B holds
twenty shares with a $600 fair market value. Accordingly, instead
of allocating two-thirds of his $100 basis to the redemption, the
correct allocation is 50% of $100, or $50. After the redemption, B
continues to hold one-half of his original 50% investment in X
Corp. with one-half of his $100 investment yet to be recovered.
The gain to B on the redemption is $600 minus $50, or $550 which,
pursuant to proposed section 300(7), is treated as a capital gain. X
Corp.'s earnings and profits have been fully accounted for on the
deemed pro rata distribution under proposed section 300(4).
Case 3-X distributes $600 to A and $600 to B. A buys thirty
shares from B for $600.
Proposed section 300 effectively treats Cases 1 and 2 as though
they were Case 3 with adjustments made for the number of shares
outstanding. Although Case I results in 240 shares outstanding,
Case 2 with eighty shares outstanding, and Case 3 with 120 shares
outstanding, all three cases reach the same economic result. Pro-
posed section 300 and existing law solve Case 3 identically. The
pro rata distribution is in keeping with proposed section 300(4). A
and B each have $600 ordinary income in accordance with pro-
posed sections 300(6) and (9). On the sale, proposed sections
300(5), (7), and (8) produce a $550 gain for B, with A acquiring a
total basis in his X stock of $700 ($100 original and $600 cost
under I.R.C. section 1012), while B retains a $50 basis in his re-
maining thirty shares.
Case 4-B sells thirty shares to A for $900, and X then distrib-
utes $900 to A and $300 to B.
Case 4 is similar to Case 3 except that the sale precedes the cor-
porate distribution. Under existing law, the effect of the reversed
order of events gives B a higher percentage of capital gain on his
total income of $1,150 while A receives $300 of income without
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gain. 5 Proposed section 300 conforms Case 4 to the other cases.
Proposed section 300(5) treats the sale as a redemption by X
followed by a purchase from X by A.'6 The second sentence of sec-
tion 300(6) gives B ordinary income treatment "to the extent of his
ratable share of earnings and profits attributable to the stock
transferred." Under proposed section 300(9), B's ratable share of
earnings and profits is $600, and proposed section 300(10) allocates
$300 of that sum to the sale proceeds, producing a $300 ordinary
income component.6 7 Of the remaining $600 deemed distributed,
proposed sections 300(7) and (8) mandate a $50 recovery of the
basis allocable to thirty shares sold, and a $550 capital gain for the
excess received over the basis. A's basis following the purchase is
$1,000 (the $100 original basis and the $900 cost basis).
The $1,200 distribution from X is pro rata according to the stock
interests of A and B following the sale, thus satisfying proposed
section 300(4). To determine the ordinary income component to A
and B pursuant to proposed section 300(6), the ratable share of
earnings and profits for A and B must be determined. The $1,200
earnings and profits acccount of X is decreased by the $300 of or-
dinary income recognized by B on the sale to A. Of the remaining
$900 earnings and profits, B's ratable share under proposed section
300(9) is $300, and A's is $600. Proposed section 300(6) then will
tax A on $600 ordinary income, and proposed section 300(7) will
result in a basis reduction from $1,000 to $700. B will be taxed on
$300 ordinary income under proposed section 300(6).
In sum, B is taxed on $600 ordinary income ($300 on the sale
and $300 on the distribution), and $550 capital gains on the sale,
leaving B with a basis of $50 in his remaining thirty shares. A is
taxed on $600 ordinary income on the distribution and, after the
65. In Case 3, under existing law, B recognizes $600 ordinary income and $550 capital
gain, whereas in Case 4 the capital gain is $850 and the ordinary income component is $300.
A, who could expect $600 ordinary income by virtue of his share of earnings and profits,
must report $900 of ordinary income as a result of his acquisition of 30 shares from B, even
though the extra $300 was earned prior to his acquisition. See supra notes 14 & 57.
66. Because proposed § 300(5) provides a constructive redemption, proposed § 300(4),
which applies to actual distributions, does not mandate pro rata treatment.
67. Under the formula of proposed § 300(10), B, who owned stock worth $1,800 prior to
the sale, held only $900 of stock following the sale, or a 50% decrease. The product of the
50% decrease and B's $600 ratable share of earnings and profits provides $300 of earnings
and profits attributable to such proceeds.
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basis reduction mandated by proposed section 300(7), has a $700
basis in his ninety shares.
Case 5-B sells fifteen shares to A for $450, and X then redeems
twenty shares from B for $600. X Corp. then makes a
distribution of $450 to A and $150 to B.
Case 5 increases the complexity of previous cases by combining a
sale, redemption, and distribution. Proposed section 300, however,
reaches the same result in Case 5 as in the previous cases. The
Code in its present form reaches yet another tax configuration
whereby B has only $150 ordinary income and $991.67 capital
gains, and A has ordinary income of $450.18
As in Case 4, proposed section 300(5) treats the sale as a simul-
taneous redemption and purchase. On the deemed redemption, the
second sentence of proposed section 300(6) compels ordinary in-
come treatment of the proceeds to the extent of earnings and prof-
its attributable to the stock transferred. Proposed section 300(9)
allocates $600 of earnings and profits to A and $600 to B. Under
proposed section 300(10), $150 of earnings and profits is attributed
to the fifteen shares sold to A and is treated as ordinary income by
B.s9 Proposed section 300(7) treats the remaining sales proceeds of
$300 as follows: $25 is a recovery of basis and $275 represents capi-
tal gain.70 A takes a $450 basis in the purchased shares under
I.R.C. section 1012 and has an overall basis at this point of $550 in
his seventy-five shares. B has a basis of $75 in his remaining forty-
five shares.
On the redemption, there is a two-step calculation. First, there is
a deemed pro rata distribution. Second, A is deemed to contribute
his deemed distribution to the capital of X which uses the contri-
bution to redeem the twenty shares of B. Proposed section 300(4)
compels pro rata treatment. A, who after the purchase owns sev-
68. See Case 5 supra p. 4.
69. Under the formula of proposed § 300(10), B's stock ownership, valued at $1,800'prior
to the sale, decreases to $1,350 following the sale. B's percentage decrease is $450/$1,800 or
25%. Therefore, the portion of B's ratable share of earnings and profits attributable to the
15 shares sold is 25% X $600, or $150.
70. Under the formula of proposed § 300(8), the basis allocated to the 15 shares sold$450 decrease in ownership
equals: $100 total basis X = $25.
$1,800 original ownership.
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enty-five of 120 shares outstanding, is deemed to receive $375, and
B the remaining $225. 71 Because A's ratable share of earnings and
profits under proposed section 300(9) is $600, the entire $375 will
be ordinary income to him in accordance with proposed section
300(6). B's ratable share of earnings and profits following the
shares has been reduced to $450, which still renders his $225
deemed distribution ordinary income.
The second step of the redemption under the proposal is a si-
multaneous contribution to capital and redemption as provided in
the second sentence of proposed section 300(5). On the contribu-
tion to capital, A increases his existing $550 basis in his X stock by
$375 to $925.12 On the simultaneous redemption, B receives $375
for the twenty shares redeemed. Proposed section 300(6) requires
ordinary income treatment to the extent of the earnings and prof-
its attributable to the stock transferred. Under proposed section
300(10), the ordinary income component is $75.73 Proposed section
300(7) addresses the treatment of the additional $300 of proceeds
deemed distributed on the redemption. In accordance with pro-
posed section 300(8), $25 is a nontaxable recovery of basis and
$275 is a capital gain.74 B is left with a basis of $50 in his remain-
ing twenty-five shares. The two-step calculation of the redemption
under the proposal can be compared with existing treatment and
illustrated as follows:
71. A should receive 75/120 of the $600 deemed distribution, or $375. B should receive
45/120 X $600, or $225.
72. See supra note 64.
73. Conceptually, B, who started Case 5 with $600 as his ratable share of earnings and
profits and has accounted for $150 on the sale and $225 on the deemed pro rata distribution
arising out of the redemption, is left with $225 of earnings and profits. B's stock ownership
immediately following the deemed distribution and prior to the redemption aspect was val-
ued at $1,125 (45 shares valued at $1,350 minus the $225 deemed distribution). Following
the redemption, B's 25 shares were valued at $750. The $375 decline in value is a 33.33%
decrease. Accordingly, 33.33% X $225 = $75 of earnings and profits are attributable to the
stock redeemed.
74. Under the formula of proposed § 300(8), B's stock ownership before the redemp-tion
was valued at $1,125 and afterwards at $750. B thus experienced a 33.33% decrease
$375 ) in his $75 basis. See supra note 73.
$1,125
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EXISTING LAW PROPOSAL
Step 1:
\ $600
20 shares $375
Step 2:
/$375 \ $37520 shares
A B
The need for the two-step analysis arises from the recognition that,
to the extent that the fair market value of A's stock ownership
does not decline as a result of the $600 paid out by X Corp., A has
realized a benefit in the form of increased proportionate participa-
tion in X Corp.
Finally, pro rata distributions are made to A and B, A owning
seventy-five shares receiving $450, and B owning twenty-five shares
receiving $150. Under proposed sections 300(6) and (9), computa-
tion of the ratable share of earnings and profits for A and B is
necessary. X's earnings and profits account following the redemp-
tion is $375. B's ratable share is $150, and A's ratable share is
$225
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$225.75 On the distribution then, B treats all $150 as ordinary in-
come as directed by proposed section 300(6), resulting in a basis of
$50 in his remaining twenty-five shares. A must treat $225 as ordi-
nary income, and the excess distribution of $225 reduces his $925
stock basis to $700 in accordance with proposed section 300(7).
In sum, B has $600 ordinary income ($150 on the sale, $300 on
the redemption, and $150 on the distribution), and $550 capital
gains ($275 on the sale and $275 on the redemption). A must rec-
ognize $600 ordinary income ($375 on the redemption and $225 on
the distribution). B is left with a basis of $50 in his 25% stock
interest in X, while A has a $700 basis in his 75% interest.
C. Application of Proposed Section 300: Nonconvertible Pre-
ferred Stock.
The analysis thus far has focused solely on cases in which only
common stock is outstanding. For the most part, the prior analysis
has centered on distributions and redemptions presently covered
by I.R.C. sections 301 and 302 respectively. By considering the ef-
fects of distributions of preferred stock and on preferred stock,
proposed section 300 also addresses issues that I.R.C. section 305
presently attempts to resolve.7 6 The application of proposed sec-
tion 300 points out some of the inadequacies and confusion haunt-
ing the existing statute.
The central provision of proposed section 300 relevant to stock
dividends is the last sentence of section 300(4) which provides for
tax consequences on a distribution of the distributing corporation's
stock only when the receiving shareholders increase their propor-
tionate interests in the distributing corporation. Distributions that
do not alter proportionate interests are ignored for tax purposes in
75. Of A and B's original $600 ratable share of earnings and profits, B has recognized $150
on the sale and $300 on the redemption. A has recognized $375 on the redemption.
76. For a discussion of I.R.C. § 305, see generally Andrews & Wilson, Stock Dividend
Taxation Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: Expansion of An Ominous Past, 13 Aiz. L.
REv. 751 (1971); Bashian, Stock Dividends and Section 305: Realization and the Constitu-
tion, 1971 DuKE L. Rnv. 1105 (1971); Del Cotto & Wolf, The Proportionate Interest Test of
Section 305 and the Supreme Court, 27 TAx L. Ray. 49 (1971); Metzer, The "New" Section
305, 27 TAx L. Rav. 93 (1971); Stone, Back to Fundamentals: Another Version of the Stock
Dividend Saga, 79 COLUm. L. Ray. 898 (1979).
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keeping with the logic of Eisner v. Macomber'7 7 even if a new qual-
ity of stock interest is received.
For ease of analysis, a valuation model similar to that used
above is illustrative: X Corp. has shareholders A and B. X Corp.
was formed with $2,400 of assets which are expected to produce
$240 of earnings annually, capitalized at a 10% rate by A and B. In
year one, X unexpectedly has earned $1,200 rather than $240. X
Corp. makes the following distributions on December 31:78
Case 6-A and B each owns sixty shares of common stock with a
basis of $100. A receives 10% preferred stock worth
$1,200; B receives $1,200 cash.
Case 7-Stock ownership as in Case 6. A receives 10% preferred
stock worth $1,200; B receives 120 shares of common
stock worth $1,200.
Case 8-A owns sixty shares of common worth $900 and B owns
thirty shares of 10% preferred worth $1,500 on Janu-
ary 1 of year one. A receives sixty shares of common
stock; B receives nothing.
Case 9-Stock ownership as in Case 8. B receives $150 of com-
mon; A receives nothing.
Case 10-Stock ownership as in Case 8. A receives 10% pre-
ferred stock worth $1,050; B receives $150.
Case 11-Stock ownership as in Case 8. A receives 10% pre-
ferred stock worth $1,050; B receives ten shares of
common stock worth $150.
Case 12-Stock ownership as in Case 8. A receives nothing; B
receives 10% preferred stock worth $150.
Case 13-Stock ownership as in Case 8. A receives sixty shares
of common stock; B receives 10% preferred stock
worth $150.
The tax consequences under proposed section 300 and existing law
will be considered together.
Case 6-A and B each owns sixty shares of common stock with a
basis of $100. A receives 10% preferred stock worth
77. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
78. In all cases, it is assumed that the preferred stock is cumulative and nonparticipating.
Although the proposal applies to all types of stock interests, the valuation of the distribu-
tion and the allocation of earnings and profits to noncumulative and/or participating stock
may be more difficult.
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$1,200; B receives $1,200 cash.
In Case 6, immediately prior to distribution, A and B each owns
stock with a fair market value of $1,800.79 Following the distribu-
tion, A and B each owns common stock with a fair market value of
$600, and A owns preferred stock worth $1,200.80 The tax conse-
quences under both existing law and proposed section 300 are
identical to those described above in Case 1.81 The only difference
between proposed section 300 and I.R.C. section 305(b)(2) is in the
capital gains component. Neither A nor B has any gain as a result
of the pro rata stock distribution as mandated by proposed section
300(4). As a consequence of the hypothetical pro rata distribution
followed by A's purchase of B's preferred stock, B can offset only
$50 of his $100 basis rather than the full amount which is pres-
ently allowed under I.R.C. section 301(c)(2). e2 Accordingly, B's
capital gain on the deemed sale under the proposal is $550. A and
B each has a $50 basis in his common stock, and A has a $650 basis
in his preferred stock.
Case 7-Stock ownership as in Case 6. A receives 10% preferred
stock worth $1,200; B receives 120 shares of common
stock worth $1,200.
I.R.C. section 305(b)(3) was enacted specifically to make this
type of transaction taxable. 3 Moreover, A and B are taxed even
79. On January 1, there were expected earnings of $2 per share ( $240 earnings )120 shares outstanding
which were capitalized at 10%, providing a $20 per share fair market value. See supra note
20. During the course of the year, X Corp. earned an additional $1,200 available for distri-
bution or $10 per share. Accordingly, as of December 31, A and B each held 60 shares worth
$30 or $1,800.
80. The distribution of $1,200 decreases the value of the outstanding 120 shares by $10
per share. In addition, the distribution of the preferred commits $1,200 of X's assets to the
preferred shares, thereby decreasing the value of the common by an additional $10 per
share.
81. See supra pp. 19-20. Under I.R.C. §§ 305(b)(2) and 301, A and B each has $600 of
ordinary income and $500 capital gain. A ends up with a $1,200 basis in the preferred stock
and, like B, a $0 basis in the common.
82. See I.R.C. § 307 for the allocation of basis to the stock received in the deemed pro
rata distribution.
83. I.R.C. § 305(b)(3) was enacted to shore up § 305(b)(2). Congress was concerned that a
distribution of preferred stock in lieu of cash to some common shareholders while other
common shareholders received additional common stock would circumvent § 305(b)(2), be-
cause preferred stock is not "property" within the meaning of § 317. See H.R. REP. No. 413
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though there is no proportionate increase in the ownership of X
Corp." The result under existing law is contrary to the logic of
Eisner.5 All X has done is distribute more pieces of paper to A
and B; they own exactly what they owned just prior to the distri-
bution. Had X distributed $1,200 of common stock to A and B,
Eisner clearly dictates no taxation.86 To the extent Eisner contin-
ues to influence realization, the fact that B receives preferred in-
stead of common should be irrelevant. It should not matter that
the preferred stands ahead of the common for purposes of divi-
dends or in the event of liquidation. Nor should it matter that the
common carries with it the right to vote. These and other qualita-
tive differences between classes of stock are valued by the market,
and all such differences presumably are reflected in the valuation
of the stock. For example, the "preference" aspect of the stock
may result in a lower discount rate than otherwise would be the
case. Similarly, an increase in expected earnings of a corporation
may affect the price of common stock more than nonparticipating
preferred. The preoccupation of the Code with the qualitative dif-
ferences between preferred and common stock is evident through-
out I.R.C. sections 305 and 306.8'
Proposed section 300 is neutral as to the qualities of the stock
distributed. Instead, the focus is on fair market value, or the mar-
ket's assessment of those qualities. The distribution of proportion-
ate amounts of X Corp. stock to A and B has no tax consequences
under the second sentence of proposed section 300(4) because
neither shareholder increases his ownership in X relative to the
other shareholder.88
(Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Seas. 113 (1969); S. RaP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Seas. 152 (1969).
84. Prior to the distribution, each shareholder owns X stock with a fair market value of
$1,800. The $1,200 of preferred stock is a prior claim on $1,200 of X Corp.'s $3,600 of total
assets. The remaining $2,400 will produce expected earnings of $240 which are capitalized at
10% leaving $2,400 of value to the common shareholders. In order for B to receive $1,200 of
common stock, the prior holdings of A and B each are reduced to $600 in value when B
receives 120 additional common shares. Following the distribution, B holds 180 shares of
common stock worth $1,800, and A holds 60 shares of common stock worth $600 and pre-
ferred stock worth $1,200.
85. See supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. LR.C. § 302(b)(2) also is restricted to a qualitative measure of equity ownership-the
right to vote.
88. The quality of an equity interest can be misleading. For example, in Baron v. Allied
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Case 8-A owns sixty shares of common worth $900 and B owns
thirty shares of 10% preferred worth $1,500 on January
1 of year one. A receives sixty shares of common stock;
B receives nothing.
Under existing law, there are no tax consequences to A or B.
I.R.C. section 305(b)(2)(B) requires a proportionate increase in
ownership, and A cannot increase his proportionate ownership be-
cause B owns preferred shares that are not weakened by the issu-
ance of more common shares.89 Proposed section 300(4) reaches
the same result, because the distribution is pro rata to the common
shareholder, A, and does not increase his proportionate interest.
Any cash received by B would be taxable to him as a pro rata dis-
tribution on preferred stock under proposed section 300(4).
Case 9-Stock ownership as in Case 8. B receives $150 of com-
mon stock; A receives nothing.
I.R.C. section 305(b)(4) clearly will tax B on the $150 fair market
value of the common received.90 Proposed section 300(4) would al-
low B to receive the $150 of common stock without tax conse-
quences because the distribution does not increase B's proportion-
ate interest in X Corp. Immediately prior to the distribution, B
owned preferred stock with a total fair market value of $1,650
Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (DeL Ch. 1975), both voting common and nonvoting
preferred were outstanding. The preferred, however, had contingent voting rights in the
event of a specified dividend default. As a result of default, the preferred shareholders were
able to select and control the Board of Directors from 1964 through 1974. Thus, regardless
of the apparent voting control of the common shareholders, the preferred shareholders ran
the corporation. In contrast, Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 DeL Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331
(1940) presents a situation in which the "preference" of the preferred shareholders was an
illusion. The preferred shares had a $6 annual dividend rate and were redeemable at $100
plus accumulated dividends. Although dividends had accumulated in excess of $29 per
share, a merger with a wholly owned subsidiary was approved cancelling the arrearages. In
upholding the elimination of the arrearages, the court emphasized the power of the majority
to alter the preferred contract rights if the terms of the merger were "fair and equitable."
The appraisal right granted to the dissenters was deemed to be an adequate remedy. See
also Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 105 R.L 36, 249 A.2d 89 (1969).
89. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex. 2 (1973).
90. Even prior to the 1954 Code, there was never any serious question that distributions
of preferred or common on preferred were taxable. See, e.g., Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S.
441 (1936) (common on preferred); Messer v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 264 (1953) (preferred
on preferred). In Koshland, the Court emphasized the acquisition of an interest different
from that inherent in the shareholder's preferred stock. 298 U.S. at 446.
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($1,500 fair market value as of January 1 and $150 for the ex-
pected 10% dividend). A's common stock is worth $1,950 ($900 fair
market value as of January 1 and $1,050 of earnings available for
distribution to A, the common shareholder). If there had been no
distribution, Eisner would preclude the taxation of either A or B
on the mere appreciation. The fact that X distributes additional
stock certificates to B to commemorate the appreciation should not
change the result. Immediately after the distribution, as immedi-
ately before, B owns a stock interest in X worth $1,650, now repre-
sented by preferred stock valued at $1,500 following the stock dis-
tribution and common stock worth $150. A continues to own
common stock with a $1,950 fair market value. As in Case 7, the
fact that a shareholder receives an interest different in quality
from his existing interest should be irrelevant to a tax system that
is directed at "income." Only fair market value should be
determinative.
Although I.R.C. section 305(b)(4) and proposed section 300(4)
reach opposite conclusions on the taxability of a common stock
dividend equal in value to the dividend expected on the preferred
stock, they reach a similar conclusion as to taxability when the
common stock dividend exceeds the dividend expected on the pre-
ferred stock. The amount of the taxable dividend, however, differs.
For example, suppose that instead of $150 of common stock, X dis-
tributes $300 of common stock to B. Under I.R.C. section
305(b)(4), B would have a $300 dividend, the fair market value of
the distributed stock. Proposed section 300(4) also would tax B,
but only to the extent that the pro. rata distribution increases B's
proportionate interest in X Corp. Immediately prior to the distri-
bution, B held a stock interest valued at $1,650 while A's interest
had a fair market value of $1,950. Immediately after the distribu-
tion, A holds X Corp. stock with a value of $1,800 ($1,500 of pre-
ferred and $300 of common), while the value of B's interest has
declined from $1,950 to $1,800. A has increased his proportionate
interest in X Corp. by $150.1
To determine the tax consequences of the $150 proportionate in-
crease, it is necessary to allocate earnings and profits between the
91. In Koshland, supra note 90, the preferred stock was paid in lieu of the expected cash
dividends, yet the Supreme Court held the entire value of the preferred stock to be taxable.
[Vol. 24:1
TAXATION OF REINVESTED CORPORATE EARNINGS
common and preferred stock. Proposed section 300(6) treats the
$150 proportionate increase as ordinary income to the extent of the
taxpayer's ratable share of earnings and profits. The $1,500 of cu-
mulative nonparticipating preferred stock paying a 10% dividend
holds a claim on $150 of earnings and profits in any year. Any
earnings and profits in excess of that amount are allocable to the
common shares.2 This allocation method is currently applied in
Treasury Regulations93 for purposes of determining the dividend
portion of gain from the sale or exchange of stock in certain foreign
corporations. Because of the limitless variations inherent in pre-
ferred stock, Treasury Regulation section 1.951-1(c)(3) places the
burden of a reasonable allocation method on the taxpayer when
the corporation has discretion to allocate the earnings to different
classes of stock. In the absence of a reasonable allocation method,
all stock will be treated as one class sharing pro rata in the earn-
ings and profits. To restate the principle underlying the applica-
tion of proposed section 300(4) to Case 9, a distribution of common
preferred should be taxable only to the extent the distribution ex-
ceeds the value of the expected dividend.9
Case 10-Stock ownership as in Case 8. A receives 10% pre-
ferred stock worth $1,050; B receives $150.
Case 10, like Case 9, focuses on the receipt by some shareholders
of a different qualitative interest in the corporation. Here, the
92. If the preferred stock were participating evenly with the common stock in all earnings
and profits in excess of the stated dividend, $675 of earnings and profits would be allocated
to the preferred ($150 stated dividend and $525 of the remaining $1,050 of earnings and
profits).
93. See Tress. Reg. §§ 1.1248-3(c)(4), T.D. 6779, 1965-1 C.B. 383, 400 amended by T.D.
7545, 1978-1 C.B. 245, 248 and 1.951-1(e)(2), (3) (1965).
94. For the application of the principle in another context, consider Y Corp. valued at
$1,000, owned by A with 10 shares of common and B with 90 shares of common, each share
worth $10. Y distributes a dividend of 10 shares of Y stock to B and $.01 to A. According to
I.R.C. § 305(b)(2), B is taxed on the fair market value of 10 shares or $90.91( $1,00value of Y)
X 10 shares received
110 shares outstanding
even though his total interest in Y after the distribution is $909.09, only $9.09 more than
before. The correct result should be to tax B on $9.09, the value of the one additional share
received over what would have been a pro rata distribution-one share to A and nine shares
to B. That is, if B sells the one additional share, he maintains his original 90% interest in X
Corp. Proposed § 300(4) leads to this conclusion.
19821
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
common shareholder receives preferred. Even prior to the 1954
Code, courts following the proportionate test as evolved in Helver-
ing v. Sprouse" and Strassburger v. Commissioner"6 found the
stock dividend to be taxable in the Case 10 pattern. 7 I.R.C. section
305(b)(2) continues this result.98 Therefore, A would be taxed on
$1,050 ordinary income and B on $150 ordinary income.
This result, however, is unsatisfactory because A does not in-
crease his proportionate interest in X as measured by the fair mar-
ket value of his equity ownership immediately before and after the
distribution. Immediately prior to the distribution on December
31, B holds preferred stock valued at $1,650 ($1,500 plus $150
earnings); A's common stock is worth $1,950 ($900 as of January 1
plus $1,050 of earnings). Immediately after the distribution, A con-
tinues to possess a $1,950 interest in X Corp. B will be taxed on
the $150 cash received, and his stock interest will then be $1,500. If
A's stock dividend has been $1,050 of common stock rather than
preferred, the Code would not tax the dividend. 9 The result
should be no different merely because a different quality of equity
ownership is distributed. Again, the fair market value of the equity
distribution should govern the tax consequences. Let the market
determine the value of the preferred nature of the stock.
The fact that the Case 10 pattern should not result in tax conse-
quences to A does not mean that all distributions of preferred on
common should be tax-free. The distribution of $1,050 of preferred
stock in Case 10 does not pose a threat to B's existing preferred
stock because X Corp., with $3,600 of assets as of December 31,
has sufficient assets to cover the value of the stock and to produce
earnings sufficient to pay the future dividends. At some point, a
distribution of preferred to A would dilute the value of B's existing
95. 318 U.S. 604 (1943).
96. Id. In Sprouse, supra note 95, the shareholder owned voting common stock, and a pro
rata distribution of nonvoting common stock was made to shareholders of both voting and
nonvoting common stock. Although the shareholder received a different type of stock inter-
est, the Supreme Court held that the dividend was not income because there was no change
in the shareholder's proportional interest. Similarly, in Strassburger, a dividend of preferred
on common to the corporation's sole shareholder was not income.
97. See, e.g., Pizitz v. Patterson, 183 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ala. 1960); Paper v. Commis-
sioner, 29 B.T.A. 523 (1933).
98. See Tress. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex. 3 (1973).
99. See supra Case 8 at p. 30 and Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex. 2 (1973).
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preferred shares, thereby giving A a proportionate increase in the
value of X Corp.100 To the extent of a shift in proportionality, A
should be taxable.
Case 11-Stock ownership as in Case 8. A receives 10% pre-
ferred stock worth $1,050; B receives ten shares of
common stock worth $150.
Case 11 combines aspects of Cases 7, 9, and 10. As in Cases 9
and 10, the shareholders receive a different quality of equity inter-
est than they previously owned. As in Case 7, A and B each re-
ceives a pro rata share of the earnings and profits. Under I.R.C.
section 305(b)(4), B will be taxed on $150, the fair market value of
the distribution. Because A is considered to have increased his pro-
portionate share in X, 101 I.R.C. section 305(b)(2) is invoked as B is
considered to have received "property."102
Proposed section 300(4) would give A and B tax-free treatment
of the stock dividends. Both immediately before and after the dis-
tribution, A owns stock with a $1,950 fair market value while B's
stock is valued at $1,650. There is no change in proportionate
interest.
Case 12-Stock ownership as in Case 8. A receives nothing; B
receives 10% preferred stock worth $150.
Case 12, like Case 9, is ruled by I.R.C. section 305(b)(4) which
taxes B on the $150 fair market value.103 Proposed section 300(4)
would not tax B, who merely receives additional stock certificates
100. For example, if B owns 30 shares comprising his $1,500 of 10% preferred stock, and
the dividend to A in Case 10 was 60 shares of identical preferred stock, A would be taxed to
the extent that his proportionate interest in X increased above $1,950. Following the distri-
bution of the stock to A and $150 to B, X Corp. is valued at $3,450. Because A's and B's
preferred claims exceed the value of X's assets, A's preferred interest entitles him to
$2,311.50 of that value (.67 X $3,450) while B's interest declines from $1,500 to $1,138.50.
The common stock declines in value to $0 because of the preferred claims. Proposed §
300(4) would tax A on his $361.50 proportionate increase in X ($2,311.50 share value after
the distribution minus $1,950 share value prior to the distribution). B would be taxed on the
$150 cash dividend.
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex. 3 (1973).
102. I.R.C. § 305(b)(4), in conjunction with the flush language of § 305(b), treats the dis-
tribution on preferred as "property," triggering § 305(b)(2). See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex.
15 (1973).
103. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d), Ex. 1 (1973).
19821
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
representing his appreciation in the X Corp. stock. No shift in pro-
portionate interest has occurred. If B's stock dividend equaled
$300 of 10% preferred stock, proposed section 300(4) would call
for a tax on $150, the disproportionate amount received by B.10
Suppose instead that no stock dividend was paid, but that B's
stock was 10% discount preferred issued on January 1 for $1,500
and redeemable on December 31 of year two for $1,815. I.R.C. sec-
tion 305(c) combines with section 305(b)(4) to tax B on $150 in
year one, a result consistent with the analysis of Case 12 under
existing law. 10 5 Here again, there has been no proportionate shift in
the ownership of X, and no immediate tax should result until re-
demption, at which time there will be ordinary income recognition
to B in accordance with proposed sections 300(6) and (7).loc
Case 13-Stock ownership as in Case 8. A receives sixty shares
of common stock; B receives 10% preferred stock
worth $150.
Combining Cases 8 and 10, this pattern produces predictable re-
sults under both the existing and proposed statutory framework.
I.R.C. section 305(b)(4) taxes B on the $150 fair market value
while A escapes unscathed under I.R.C. section 305(a). There
would be no tax consequences under proposed section 300(4), be-
cause both A and B continue to own stock in X, valued at $1,950
and $1,650 respectively, as they did immediately prior to the
distribution. 10 7
D. Application of Proposed Section 300: Preferred Redemptions
The impact of a redemption on nonredeeming shareholders was
considered above in Case 2 in which only common stock was out-
104. B has increased his ownership interest from $1,650 immediately prior to the distribu-
tion to $1,800 immediately after, while A's interest has decreased from $1,950 to $1,800 for
the same period.
105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b) (1973), which mandates a constructive distribution to
the extent the redemption premium is not "reasonable." See also id. at § 1.305-5(d), Exs. 7,
8 (1973). For a critical evaluation of the treatment of discounted preferred stock, see Note,
Discounted Preferred Stock Under the New Section 305 Treasury Regulations: On Confus-
ing Debt and Equity, 84 YALE L.J. 324 (1974).
106. See infra pp. 36-37 for a discussion of preferred stock redemptions.
107. The value of the 60 shares of common distributed to A is $975. The value of his
original 60 shares decreases from $1,950 to $975 to reflect the additional shares distributed.
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standing. 08 The analysis is applicable to redemptions of preferred
stock as well. When preferred stock is redeemed, it is the remain-
ing common shareholders who increase their proportionate interest
in the corporation.109 Although isolated redemptions do not cause
tax consequences to the nonredeeming shareholders under I.R.C.
section 305,110 tax consequences result under proposed section 300.
Again, X Corp., with a value of $3,600 including $1,200 of earnings
and profits, is used as a model:
Case 14-A owns common stock worth $900 when issued on Jan-
uary 1 and $1,950 on December 31. B owns 10% pre-
ferred stock worth $1,500 when issued on January 1
and $1,650 on December 31. At year end, X redeems
$1,200 worth of B's stock.
Under existing law, I.R.C. section 302(b)(1) is likely to give B a
$109.09 capital gain.1 A will have no tax consequences. 12 In con-
trast, proposed section 300 will cause both A and B to recognize
ordinary income on the redemption. Proposed section 300(4) treats
the $1,200 paid by X as a pro rata distribution to B and A, whose
interests in X increase due to the redemption.113 If X merely had
distributed $1,200 to B not in redemption, A's stock would have
declined in value from $1,950 to $900.11" Because preferred shares
of B are surrendered in exchange for the $1,200 distributed, A's
108. See supra pp. 20-22.
109. See supra note 49.
110. See Rev. Rul. 78-115 1978-1 C.B. 85. See also supra note 12.
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) (1960); Rev. Rul. 77-426, 1977-2 C.B. 87 (redemption of
any nonvoting, nonconvertible, nonparticipating preferred is meaningful if the shareholders
own no common directly or indirectly). Assuming no portion of the $1,200 is deemed to be a
dividend to B, B's capital gain will be($1,200$1,200 - k X $1,500 basis $109.09.
$1,650
See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 32, at 1 9.61 for a discussion of possible dividend conse-
quences to a redeeming shareholder where the amount received exceeds the value of the
share surrendered. B's basis in his remaining $450 of stock will be( $1,200 =$0.9
$1,500- X $1,500 $409.09.
$1,650
112. See supra note 12.
113. See supra note 49.
114. X Corp., after a $1,200 distribution, would have $2,400 of assets to which B and A
would have preferred claims of $1,500 and $900 respectively.
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stock increases in value from $900 to $1,950. Proposed section
300(4), therefore, treats A as having received a distribution of
$1,050 and B as having received $150. The deemed distributions
are taxed as ordinary income pursuant to proposed sections 300(6)
and (9). Following the deemed distribution, proposed section
300(5) treats A as contributing his $1,050 deemed distribution to
X, thereby increasing his stock basis from $900 to $1,950.115 Simul-
taneously, B is deemed to receive $1,050.111 Because B has ac-
counted for his ratable share of earnings and profits on the deemed
distribution, proposed section 300(7) treats the $1,050 as a reduc-
tion of the $1,050 basis in the stock exchanged, leaving B with pre-
ferred stock having a basis and fair market value of $450. A holds
common stock with a basis and fair market value of $1,950. In ef-
fect, B is treated as though he received his $150 dividend and re-
deemed $1,050 of his original $1,500 of preferred stock.11
E. Application of Proposed Section 300: Convertible Preferred
Finally, distributions of convertible preferred and nonconvert-
ible preferred would be treated in a different manner under pro-
posed section 300 than under current law. I.R.C. sections 305(b)(5)
and 301 tax most distributions of convertible preferred, because
some shareholders may convert and others will keep the pre-
ferred.118 No effort is made by proposed section 300 to assess the
115. See I.R.C. § 118; Tress. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1960).
116. Immediately after the deemed distribution and prior to the redemption, B's stock
was valued at $1,500. Following the redemption, B held $450 of preferred stock (he started
with $1,650 of stock of which $1,200 was redeemed). Thus, B's ownership declined by
$,5$45 -70%. On the redemption, proposed § 300(8) allocates 70% X $1,500 ba-
$1,500
sis = $1,050 to the preferred shares surrendered.
117. A will be taxed on $1,050 without receiving any cash. He can, however, sell $1,050 of
stock at no gain without decreasing his equity ownership in X Corp. Originally, A owned
stock worth $900, or 37.5% of X Corp.'s $2,400 value. X then earned $1,200 which was used
to redeem B's stock, increasing A's stock value to $1,950. If A sells $1,050 of his stock, he
will then return to his 37.5% share of equity ownership.
118. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-6 (1973). The statutory presumption can be overcome when
the conversion right may be exercised over a period of many years. It should be noted that
any distribution of convertible preferred on outstanding preferred is taxable under I.R.C. §
305(b)(4) regardless of the likelihood of convertibility. If the distribution is on common
stock, § 305(b)(5) serves to prevent an end-run around § 305(b)(3) if some shareholders
convert and some do not. See generally Metzer, supra note 76, at 136-38.
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likelihood of conversion. Moreover, the fact that some shareholders
may end up with common while others keep the preferred is irrele-
vant. The fair market value of the stock serves as the measure of
the desirability of various equity features. As long as the distribu-
tion of the convertible preferred does not change a shareholder's
proportionate interest in X Corp., the distribution should not be
taxed.119
Distributions on convertible preferred and on common when
convertible preferred is outstanding can alter proportionate inter-
ests of the shareholders. For example, if common shareholders re-
ceive cash and convertible preferred shareholders increase their
conversion ratio, I.R.C. section 305(b)(2) will tax the preferred
shareholders on the value of the additional conversion rights as
measured by the value of the additional common shares assuming
full conversion.120 The primary difficulty with existing treatment of
convertible preferred lies in the valuation of increased and de-
creased conversion rights.
For purposes of illustration, X Corp. has shareholder A who
owns sixty shares of common with a fair market value of $900, and
shareholder B who owns 8% preferred stock with a fair market
value of $1,500 which is convertible into sixty shares of common. X
Corp. has ample earnings and profits. Without the conversion priv-
ilege, 8% preferred stock would have a fair market value of $1,200;
the excess $300 represents a conversion premium.12 1
Case 15-X distributes $1 to B and decreases the conversion ra-
tio to thirty shares.
In accordance with the regulations under I.R.C. section
305(b)(2), A probably would be taxed on $800 by virtue of B's re-
119. See Case 7 supra pp. 28-30.
120. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Exs. 6, 7 (1973). Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(d) (1973) allows
an increase in conversion ratio that serves to adjust for a stock dividend on the residual
common shares. See Trees. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex. 5 (1973).
121. The market price of a convertible instrument has been described by the following
illustration:
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duced conversion privilege. 22 The regulations attempt to analyze
A's tax position assuming full conversion. With that assumption, A
has increased his ownership percentage to 66.67% (sixty out of
ninety shares) following the conversion ratio reduction. The
amount of A's distribution is measured by the fair market value of
the number of shares which would have been distributed to A had
X sought to increase A's ownership percentage from his original
50 % to 66.67 %. This deemed sixty share distribution would have a
total fair market value of $800.1s This result not only ignores any
decrease in value of A's original sixty shares contrary to Eisner v.
Macomber,'" but also ignores the fact that A's stock value can in-
crease only by a $300 maximum as a result of a change in B's con-
version ratio. Even if B's conversion privilege were totally elimi-
nated, the unadorned 8% preferred would have a $1,200 fair
market value, leaving a maximum of $1,200 value for the common
> Value of 89. Nonconvertible Preferred
Market Price of Common
See MAo, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DECISIONS 413 (1976); VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
AND PoLicY 604 (4th ed. 1977); See generally Quandt, Malkiel & Baumal, The Valuation of
Convertible Securities, THEORY OF BusiNEss FNANcE (Weston and Woods ed. 1967); Walter
& Que, The Valuation of Convertible Bonds, 28 J. OF FINANCE 713-32 (1973).
The premium over both the straight preferred price and the conversion value is justified
by the floor that the preferred offers, severely curtailing any downside risk. See VAN HORNE,
supra at 603-07.
122. See Tress. Reg. § 1.305-3(d), (e), Exs. 6-8 (1973).
123. Trees. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex. 8 (1973). The original 120 shares, assuming full conver-
sion, had a $2,400 fair market value, or $20 per share. Following the deemed distribution of
an additional 60 shares, each share has a fair market value of $13.33.
124. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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compared with its preconversion ratio adjustment value of $900.125
Proposed section 300 does not resolve the valuation difficulties
but aims at a theoretically correct valuation. Proposed section
300(2) in conjunction with section 300(1) must be read to include a
constructive stock payment to A when B's conversion ratio is re-
duced. As B's conversion ratio decreases, the value of the converti-
ble preferred decreases to somewhere between $1,200 and $1,50012'
while the value of A's common increases accordingly. The precise
increase in value to A is difficult to measure. Logically, the increase
cannot exceed the decline in value to B, assuming the conversion
privilege is fully eliminated. The burden should be on A to show
any lesser increase in value.
Case 16-X distributes $1 to A and increases the conversion ra-
tio to ninety shares.
The regulations interpreting LR.C. section 305(b)(2) would tax B
on the value of the additional thirty shares assuming full conver-
sion.12 7 B presumably would be deemed to receive a $480 distribu-
125. Even under the method prescribed by the regulations, A should not have an $800
increase in value. Prior to the deemed 60 share distribution, A had a stock value of $1,200
assuming full conversion, and after the distribution the value was $1,600 (two-thirds of the
total $2,400 value). Accordingly, the distribution under the full conversion method cannot
exceed $400. The $800 computation produced by Example 8 of Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e)
ignores the decrease in value of A's original 60 shares from $1,200 to $800 in contravention
of the reasoning in Eisner, supra note 124.
126. The decline in value of the convertible preferred can be pictured as follows:
Market Price of Common
127. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex. 6 (1973).
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tion.125 If there is full conversion, however, B's proportionate in-
crease in X Corp. will not exceed $240.129 To tax B on the fair
market value of the deemed thirty share distribution and not take
into account the dilution in value of B's existing shares is out of
step with Eisner v. Macomber.180 Conceivably, if the premium on
the convertible preferred increases or decreases as the conversion
ratio increases, the gain to B might be more or less than $240; but,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, the increase in proportion-
ate interest upon full conversion is a reasonable and administra-
tively workable measure." 1
III. EFFECT OF PROPOSED SECTION 300 ON EXISTING PROVISIONS
A. LR.C. Sections 301, 302, and 305
Proposed section 300 attempts to unify the treatment of stock
dividends, nonstock dividends, and redemptions. The taxing re-
gime of I.R.C. section 301(c) is central to the proposal. By unifying
128. Under full conversion following the adjustment, there would be 150 shares outstand-
ing to share in X's $2,400 value. Each share would be worth $16. B is deemed to receive 30
shares with a fair market value of $480 as a result of the increased conversion ratio.
129. Prior to the change in conversion ratio, B's interest in X is $1,200 fully converted.
After the change, B would hold 90 out of 150 shares, or 90/150 x $2,400 value of X = $1,440.
See supra note 125.
130. Supra note 124.
131. The rise in value of the convertible preferred can be pictured as follows:
Market Price of Common
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the treatment of these transactions, proposed section 300 would
eliminate any resort to computing artificial percentage reductions
in I.R.C. section 302(b)(2). At stake under existing law is the dif-
ference between treating all redemption proceeds as capital gains
to the extent they exceed the basis of the redeemed stock and
treating the proceeds as ordinary income assuming there are suffi-
cient earnings and profits. It is an all or nothing provision. Pro-
posed section 300 does not concern itself with percentage reduc-
tions, but rather recognizes that a redemption might have both an
ordinary income and capital gains component.132 A shift in focus
from the arbitrary 50% and 80% tests to a determination of the
ordinary and capital gains components is more satisfying on a the-
oretical level and would eliminate the need for litigation and ad-
ministrative rulings, the sole concern of which is percentage reduc-
tion of ownership. 133
I.R.C. section 302 is inseparable from the attribution rules of
I.R.C. section 318.14 In the context of section 302, the attribution
rules prevent shareholders from apparently qualifying for capital
gains treatment while indirectly retaining percentage ownership in
the corporation that belies any meaningful reduction.135 For exam-
ple, A and B, father and son and sole owners of X Corp., each own
sixty shares worth $1,800 with a basis of $120. X, with $1,200 of
earnings and profits, redeems thirty shares from A for $900. In the
absence of the attribution rules, A would satisfy the percentage re-
quirements of I.R.C. section 302(b)(2) and be entitled to capital
gains treatment.138 However, by virtue of attribution, A is deemed
132. Sprinkled throughout the Code are provisions that bifurcate gain into ordinary in-
come and capital gains components. Cf. I.R.C. § 1237 (treating 5% of the sales price of
certain subdivided property as ordinary income and the remainder as capital gain); I.R.C. §
631 (treating appreciation in standing timber as capital gain when the timber is cut, and
profits in selling the cut timber as ordinary income).
133. Much of the litigation and administrative activity is aimed at satisfying the "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend" requirement of I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) by showing a mean-
ingful reduction. See cases and rulings cited by Brrran & EuSTIC., supra note 32, at 1 9.24
nn.70-72.
134. See I.R.C. § 302(c).
135. For a general discussion of the attribution rules, see BrrrKFR & EusTicE, supra note
32, at 1 9.31; Goldstein, Bringing the Attribution Rules Into Sharper Focus; How and
Where They Apply, 26 J. TAx'N 280 (1967); Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock
Ownership in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HAnv. L. REv. 209 (1958).
136. A owns 50% before and 33.33% after the redemption, less than 80% of his original
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to own all of the shares actually owned by B, and consequently, A
owns 100% of X before and after the redemption.137 The result is
apparently $900 of ordinary income to A.138 Again the "all or noth-
ing" philosophy of I.R.C. section 302 makes attribution crucial.
By contrast, proposed section 300 does not embrace an "all or
nothing" concept. Without attribution under proposed section
300(4), A and B each would be deemed to receive a $450 distribu-
tion which would be ordinary income under proposed section
300(6). A would have an additional $50 ordinary income, $360 cap-
ital gain and $40 return of basis on the redemption aspect of the
transaction pursuant to proposed sections 300(5), (8), and (10).1s9
ownership. A would have an $840 capital gain and a $60 return of basis.
137. See I.R.C. §§ 302(c)(1), 318(a)(1)(A)(ii).
138. See I.R.C. §§ 301, 302(d). Compare I.R.C. § 316 (no allocation of earnings and profits
on a pro rata basis among shareholders) with I.R.C. §§ 333(e), 356(a)(2)(pro rata allocation).
139. The entire redemption can be illustrated:
Step 1 X Corp.
$450
$450
A B
Step 2 X Corp.
$450 $450
A B
Immediately after the deemed distribution and prior to the hypothetical redemption, A's
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To the extent that attribution is intended to recognize the unity of
certain multiple stock interests, $450 of ordinary income to B must
be considered disadvantageous to A. This should follow from the
fact that the attribution rules regard B's ownership as a distinct
advantage to A-indeed to be owned by A. Therefore, under pro-
posed section 300, without attribution, the total ordinary income
recognized by the A-B family is $950 as well as the $360 capital
gain. The need to attribute B's ownership to A in order to prevent
avoidance of ordinary income treatment does not exist under pro-
posed section 300.140 Recognition of gain by the nonredeeming
shareholders solves the attribution problem by penalizing the re-
deemer only when a unity of relationship exists. This approach is a
sound step away from relying on the artificiality of the specified
categories set forth in I.R.C. section 318, which in fact may not
always identify any unity of relationship with the redeemer.""'
Similar problems of artificiality in I.R.C. section 305 are ad-
dressed by proposed section 300. No logic supports a provision
under which if A and B are common stock shareholders and A re-
ceives a preferred stock dividend, his tax consequences hinge on
whether B receives at least one dollar. If B does receive a dollar,
I.R.C. section 305(b)(2) will tax A; if not, section 305(b) does not
apply and the receipt of the preferred stock will not be a taxable
event. 42 Similarly, if A receives preferred stock and B receives
common stock with no change in their proportionate economic in-
stock had a $1,350 fair market value. After the redemption, A continued to hold 30 shares
valued at $900. When this 33.33% decrease in ownership is applied to A's $150 ratable share
of earnings and profits remaining after the deemed distribution, $50 will produce ordinary
income under proposed §§ 300(6) and (10). When the 33.33% decrease in ownership is ap-
plied to A, $120 is basis pursuant to proposed § 300(8), and $40 of the basis is consumed on
the redemption. The remaining $360 is a capital gain. See proposed § 300(7) supra p. 16.
140. Indeed, if proposed § 300 incorporated the attribution concept, the A-B family would
be better off, ending up with only $900 of ordinary income and no capital gain. Because
more ordinary and total income will be recognized under proposed § 300 when there is no
attribution than when attribution exists, there will be no incentive to use family or business
relationships to manufacture redemptions out of distributions, except to the extent that
attributable family or business shareholders are in lower tax brackets.
141. For unsuccessful attempts to escape the attribution rules through an assertion of
family discord, see David Metzger Trust, 76 T.C. 42 (1981); Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66.
142. The receipt is not a taxable event, because I.R.C. § 305(b)(2)(A) requires the receipt
of "property" by shareholders not increasing their proportionate interests. Presumably, the
preferred stock would be treated as "section 306 stock" under I.R.C. § 306(c).
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terests in the corporation, why should there by any immediate tax
consequences solely because of the qualitative differences in the
stock received? Proposed section 300 seeks to ignore the qualita-
tive differences of distributions in favor of the market assessment
of those differences.
Another illogical feature of I.R.C. section 305 is the fact that
only some redemptions trigger recognition of income by the re-
mainihg shareholders.143 Indeed, the more significant the redemp-
tion, and hence the more significant the proportionate gain by the
remaining shareholders in the corporation, the less the likelihood
of taxation to the remaining shareholders. By equating a redemp-
tion with a pro rata distribution followed by a purchase between
shareholders, proposed section 300 recognizes the benefits to the
remaining shareholders in all redemption situations, including par-
ticularly significant redemptions that under existing law would
qualify under I.R.C. section 302(a).
Applying the attribution rules under I.R.C. section 318 to re-
demptions but not to stock dividends presents another incongruity
under existing law. 14 If A and B, father and son, own preferred
and common respectively, and A receives a common stock divi-
dend, I.R.C. sections 302(b)(4) and 301 combine to tax A. If, in-
stead, A's stock was redeemed, in determining whether capital
gains treatment under I.R.C. section 305(b)(2) was appropriate, A
would be saddled with B's ownership in accordance with I.R.C. sec-
tion 318(a)(1)(A). If A constructively is deemed to own B's shares
for redemption purposes, A should be deemed to own 100% of the
corporate stock for stock dividend purposes, thereby rendering the
receipt of common stock by A, a 100% shareholder through con-
structive ownership, tax-free under Eisner v. Macomber.14" By rec-
ognizing the relationships between both stock and nonstock divi-
dends and redemptions, proposed section 300 would eliminate
much of the artificiality of I.R.C. sections 302 and 305, thus leaving
problems of valuation as the focal point of analysis.
143. I.R.C. §§ 305(c) and (b)(2) can combine to tax the remaining shareholders on re-
demptions, but Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(c), Exs. 10, 11, 13 (1973) limits the taxation to "iso-
lated redemptions." See Rev. Rul. 77-19, 1977-1 C.B. 83.
144. See Rev. Rul. 78-60, 1978-1 C.B. 81.
145. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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B. I.R.C. Section 304
The fact that a sale engenders capital gains treatment while a
pro rata redemption results in ordinary income treatment origi-
nally spawned the need for the predecessors to I.R.C. section
304.141 If A owns all of the stock of X Corp., the parent of Y Corp.,
a wholly owned subsidiary, and A sells some of his X stock to Y at
a profit, capital gains treatment would result on the sale in the
absence of any remedial provision.147 Even though corporate funds
were distributed to the shareholder in exchange for stock, I.R.C.
section 302 analysis would not apply because Y does not redeem
"its stock" as the statute requires. If I.R.C. section 302 were appli-
cable, A, as a 100% shareholder both before and after the transac-
tion, would not be protected by the safe harbors of I.R.C. section
302(b), and dividend treatment would result under I.R.C. section
301(c) to the extent of earnings and profits. To prevent circumven-
tion of the section 302(b) tests, Congress enacted an intercorporate
redemption provision that, in its present form, applies to both
brother-sister and parent-subsidiary corporations.
Under I.R.C. section 304(a)(1), if one or more persons are in con-
trol of each of two corporations, the transfer of stock in one corpo-
ration by a shareholder to the other corporation is treated as a
capital contribution of the stock of the issuing corporation to the
acquiring corporation followed by a redemption of the stock of the
acquiring corporation which must withstand the rigors of I.R.C.
section 302(b). In applying the section 302 tests to the deemed re-
demption, I.R.C. section 304(b)(1) directs that the stock of the is-
suing corporation should be used as a reference, but that the earn-
ings and profits of the acquiring corporation serve as the measure
of ordinary income if the redemption falls under I.R.C. section
301(c).
In the parent-subsidiary context, I.R.C. section 304(a)(2) treats
the sale of the parent's stock held by a shareholder to a subsidiary
as a redemption by the parent which must sail through one of the
146. See I.R.C. § 115(g) (1939). For a thorough analysis of I.R.C. § 304, see Marans, Sec-
tion 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions Through Related Corporations, 22 TAX. L.
REv. 161 (1967); id. at 721 addenda.
147. See Commissioner v. Trustees Common Stock John Wanamaker, 11 T.C. 365 (1948),
aff'd per curiam, 178 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1949).
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safe harbors under I.R.C. section 302(b). If the redemption does
not fall within section 302(b), the earnings and profits of the par-
ent, as increased by a-deemed distribution to the parent by the
subsidiary in the amount paid by the subsidiary for the stock, is
the measure for dividend purposes.14
Even stated in its simplest terms, I.R.C. section 304 is extremely
convoluted and difficult to apply. Among the problems created by
section 304 are the following: the earnings and profits allocation
differs depending on whether parent-subsidiary or brother-sister
corporations are involved; the calculation of control for determin-
ing brother-sister status requires application of the attribution
rules in an expansive manner;14 9 as a result of attribution, there is
complete overlap of brother-sister and parent-subsidiary corpora-
tions so that whether section 304(a)(1) or section 304(a)(2) applies
is uncertain; 50 the basis rules under the regulations are compli-
cated by the deemed contribution to capital under I.R.C. section
304(a)(1).151
The origin of I.R.C. section 304 lies in the fact that a profitable
sale of a capital asset will produce a capital gain even though a
portion of the gain represents the value of reinvested earnings and
profits. When those profits are paid out directly by the distributing
corporation in a nonqualifying redemption, however, ordinary in-
come treatment results. A "sale" of corporation stock to a related
148. See I.R.C. § 304(b)(2)(B). Whether the deemed distribution results in a constructive
dividend or merely a constructive receipt by the parent of the subsidiary's earnings and
profits is unresolved. Compare Rev. Rul. 69-261, 1969-1 C.B. 94 (constructive dividend) with
Webb v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 293 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 572 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1978)
and Virginia Materials Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 372 (1976) (no constructive
dividend).
149. The ownership of at least 50% of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote, or at least 50% of the total value of shares of all classes constitutes
"control" under I.R.C. § 304(c)(1). The constructive ownership rule of I.R.C. § 304(c)(2)
makes the 50% rule for corporation-shareholder attribution under I.R.C. § 318 inapplicable.
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2(c) purports to distinguish between brother-sister and parent-
subsidiary corporations and finds some support in the language of I.R.C. § 304. See BIrrKER
& EUSTIcE, supra note 32, at 9.31. Nevertheless, if A owns all the stock of X Corp. and Y
Corp., under I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(3)(c) and 304(c)(2), X is deemed to be the parent of Y, and Y
is deemed to be the parent of X.
151. For example, the "disappearing basis" rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.302(c) apply to I.R.C.
§ 304(a)(2) transactions under Treas. Reg. 1.304-3(a) but not to § 304(a)(1) transactions,
because the shareholder is permitted to increase the basis of his stock in the acquiring cor-
poration by the basis of the stock surrendered in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2.
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corporation vividly highlights the incongruity. Proposed section
300 does not address fully the I.R.C. section 304 problem. The pro-
posal equates every sale of stock to a simultaneous redemption and
purchase from the corporation. The seller will then recognize ordi-
nary income to the extent of earnings and profits attributable to
the stock transferred. 152 Conceptually, when sole shareholder A
sells his stock in X Corp. to a purchaser P, A is cashing out his
investment in X, drawing out his pro rata share of earnings and
profits, that is, his original investment and appreciation not due to
reinvested earnings. At the same time P is, in effect, opening his X
Corp. account with the purchase price. When P is a corporation
closely related to X within the meaning of I.R.C. section 304, how-
ever, a problem arises in determining A's pro rata share of earnings
and profits. If the transfer is a sale, only A's ratable share of earn-
ings and profits attributable to the stock transferred will produce
ordinary income. If the transfer is deemed a redemption because of
the unity of X and P, the amount received will be ordinary income
to the extent of A's ratable share of earnings and profits without
limitation.
Although proposed section 300 may lessen somewhat the need
for I.R.C. section 304 because A in many cases will recognize some
ordinary income, proposed section 300 leaves too much room for
manipulation.5 3 Some form of remedial provision is necessary. In
theory, the provision would unite the issuing and acquiring corpo-
152. See Proposed §§ 300(6), (9), (10).
153. For example, consider the following illustrations involving A, X Corp., and P Corp.:
Example 1-A owns all of the stock of X, which is worth $600 and has a basis
of $300. X has $300 of earnings and profits. P Corp., owned solely by X, buys
half the stock for $300. If the transaction is treated as a sale, A would have
$150 ordinary income pursuant to proposed §§ 300(6) and (10), and $150 basis
return under proposed § 300(7). If treated as a redemption, all $300 would be
ordinary income as the pro rata redemption is ignored.
Example 2-Same as Example 1, except that X has $0 and P has $300 earnings
and profits. Here, proposed § 300 would not help. Sales treatment would yield
a $150 capital gain because X has no earnings even though the appreciation is
due to corporate earnings. Redemption treatment results solely in a $300 re-
turn of basis, unless P's earnings and profits serve as the measure.
Example 3-Same as Example 2, except A owns 100% of X and P. The analy-
sis in Example 2 applies.
In each example, A has obtained $300 of earnings and profits out of corporate solution with-
out lessening control over X or P.
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rations for purposes of determining whether a sale or pro rata re-
demption has occurred to the extent that the issuing corporation
owns the acquiring corporation or vice versa, or the taxpayer owns
both the acquiring and issuing corporation. For example, if Y, the
acquiring corporation, were owned 50% by X, the issuing corpora-
tion, and 50% by other investors, and A, the sole shareholder of
the issuing corporation, sold half his stock, the acquiring corpora-
tion would be united with the issuing corporation to the extent of
the issuer's 50% ownership. Accordingly, one-half of the stock sold
by A (25% of the outstanding stock) would be considered re-
deemed in a pro rata redemption that is treated as a distribution
giving A ordinary income treatment to the extent of his ratable
share of earnings and profits in X plus half of the earnings and
profits of Y. The other half of the stock sold to Y would be treated
as a sale producing ordinary income to A only to the extent of any
remaining earnings and profits in X that are attributable to the
stock sold in accordance with proposed section 300(10).154 The pro-
posed split treatment might require a de minimus rule when the
overlap in ownership is relatively insignificant and does not suggest
an attempted bail-out of earnings and profits.
C. I.R.C. Section 306
I.R.C. section 306, like section 304, was enacted to correct a
weakness in the existing statutory treatment of dividends and re-
demptions. Sections 304 and 306 attempt to prevent a bail-out of
154. For example, A owns all of the stock of X Corp. (60 shares worth $600 with a basis of
$300). X, with $300 of earnings and profits, owns 50% of the stock of P Corp. which has $0
earnings and profits. A sells 30 shares to P for $300. Fifteen of the shares sold should be
considered redeemed in a pro rata manner producing $150 ordinary income in accordance
with proposed § 300(6). (If X Corp. had $0 earnings and profits and P Corp. had $300
earnings and profits, the same result would follow, because P is considered merely an
extension of X to the extent of X's 50% ownership. Accordingly, 50% of Y's earnings and
profits would be used in the earnings and profits calculation). The other 15 shares sold will
produce $50 of ordinary income pursuant to proposed §§ 300(6) and (10):
$150 decrease in stock hek. X $150 earnings and profits remaining after the deemed
$450 stock value
pro rata redemption. The other $100 received will reduce A's basis in accordance with pro-
posed § 300(7). The result is a 33.33% decrease in A's stock ownership of X's $300 basis.
The same analysis would apply in a brother-sister context if, for example, A owned 100%
of X and 50% of P.
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corporate earnings and profits at capital gains rates through a sale.
The basic transaction is illustrated by Chamberlin v. Commis-
sioner.'55 In Chamberlin, the taxpayer, an 83.8% owner of Metal
Moulding Corporation, received a preferred stock dividend along
with the other common shareholders. The preferred was 4.5% cu-
mulative, $100 par, and was subject to mandatory retirement over
a seven-year period. Two days after the dividend distribution, ne-
gotiations initiated prior to the distribution culminated in an
agreement by virtually all of Metal Moulding's shareholders to sell
the newly-issued preferred to two insurance companies. The Sixth
Circuit held that the pro rata distribution of preferred was not a
taxable dividend and that no ordinary income was attributable to
the taxpayer on the sale or the ensuing redemption. The result was
that Metal Moulding distributed cash that went to the sharehold-
ers at capital gains rates even though no ultimate change in stock
ownership occurred. 15 6
Congress attacked the preferred stock bail-out by enacting I.R.C.
section 306 which originated "section 306 stock." In simple terms,
the sale or other disposition of "section 306 stock" will produce
ordinary income rather than capital gain. Section 306, however, is
not simple in its application. Questions abound as to what consti-
tutes "section 306 stock.' 157 For example, the definition is limited
to preferred stock; however, titular common stock with preferred
characteristics has been classified as preferred stock for section 306
purposes.158 Once "section 306 stock" is classified, its treatment
155. 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 918 (1954).
156. In Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 164 (1952), rev'd, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 918 (1954) and Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.
716 (1961) (decided after the Sixth Circuit's reversal in Chamberlin), the Tax Court treated
the attempted bail-out as though the corporation had distributed a cash dividend to the
shareholders.
157. I.R.C. § 306(c)(1) applies to three categories of stock: § 306(c)(1)(A) addresses pre-
ferred stock received in a nontaxable distribution under § 305(a); § 306(c)(1)(B), relates to
preferred stock received in certain reorganizations if the effect of the transaction is substan-
tially the same as the receipt of a stock dividend, or if the stock received is in exchange for
"section 306 stock"; § 306(c)(1)(C), controls stock the basis of which is determined by refer-
ence to the basis of "section 306 stock." See generally BivrKER & EUSTIcE, supra note 32, at
1 10.03.
158. Rev. Rul. 57-132, 1957-1 C.B. 115. See Walter, 'Preferred Stock' and 'Common
Stock'. The Meaning of the Terms and the Importance of the Distinction for Tax Pur-
poses, 5 J. CORP. TAX'N 211 (1978). In some situations, preferred stock with common charac-
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varies depending on whether the stock is redeemed or sold. 159 Fi-
nally, the punitive treatment of "section 306 stock" does not apply
to certain specified, but not always ascertainable, transactions
deemed unsuitable for a bail-out of corporate earnings. 160
The evil that necessitates I.R.C. section 306 does not lie in the
original dividend of preferred shares, nor in any sale, but rather in
the redemption by the purchaser. Consider X Corp. with $200 of
earnings and profits, solely owned by A who holds common stock
with a fair market value of $1,000 and a basis of $800. X declares a
dividend of 10% preferred stock worth $200. There are no immedi-
ate tax consequences on the pro rata distribution of X's stock.' 6 '
Under existing I.R.C. section 307, A allocates $160 of basis to the
preferred and $640 to the cor.mon, which decreases in value to
$800 as a result of the distribu" ion. Under a similar principle, $40
of X's earnings and profits should be allocated to the preferred
stock. If A sells the preferred to I, an insurance company, for $200,
I.R.C. section 306 and proposed section 300 yield different results.
The existing provision immediately would tax A on $200 of ordi-
nary income. 162 The result is difficult to defend because it is not
the sale that gives rise to the bail-out. On the sale itself, A has
given up some economic control over the corporation. After the
sale, A holds common stock with a fair market value of $800, and I
holds $200 of preferred. Arguably, there is no more reason under
existing law to give A ordinary income treatment on the sale than
if there had been no distribution and A merely sold $200 of stock
to I.
Proposed section 300 recognizes that the redemption, not the
teristics is not considered "section 306 stock." See Rev. Rul. 81-91, 1981-1 C.B. 123.
159. If stock is redeemed, § 306(a)(2) provides that the amount received is a § 301 distri-
bution taxed as a dividend to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits at the time
of the redemption. If the stock is sold or otherwise disposed of, § 306(a)(1) bifurcates the
amount realized. The amount that would have been a dividend if cash instead of stock origi-
nally had been distributed produces ordinary gain while the remainder is treated as sales
proceeds.
160. See I.R.C. § 306(b). For example, see Rev. Rul. 75-247, 1975-1 C.B. 104 (sale of a
portion of shareholder's common and § 306 preferred is not excepted automatically under
I.R.C. § 306(b)(4); tax avoidance may not be a principal purpose).
161. See Strassburger v. Commissioner, 318 U.S. 604 (1943); proposed § 300(4) supra
p. 13.
162. See I.R.C. § 306(a)(1). A's basis in the preferred would be transferred to the basis of
the common. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-1(b)(2), Exs. 2, 3.
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sale, provides the bail-out.163 The sale should be treated as any
other sale, with A recognizing as ordinary income his ratable share
bf X's earnings and profits attributable to the stock sold or $40.16,
The remaining $160 received by A will offset his $160 basis in the
preferred stock.165 As long as I continues to hold the preferred,
there is no justification for taxing A on the full $200 value of the
preferred stock. If I redeems the preferred for $200, however, A
will incur further tax consequences. Redemptions have two aspects
under proposed section 300. First, there is a deemed pro rata dis-
tribution under proposed section 300(4). Second, there is a contri-
bution to capital by the nonredeeming shareholders and a simulta-
neous redemption pursuant to proposed section 300(5). The $200
distribution will be allocated on a pro rata basis by proposed sec-
tion 300(4). Had there been merely a distribution of $200, A's com-
mon stock would have decreased in value from $800 to $600.1e6
However, because I's preferred stock is redeemed in exchange for
the $200 distribution, the value of A's common stock does not de-
crease by $200 but remains at $800 following the redemption. The
$200 "increase" in the value of A's stock, or alternatively the fact
that A's stock did not decrease in value to $600 following the dis-
tribution, determine that $200 will be deemed distributed to A and
$0 to I under proposed section 300(4). Because A, following the
transactions, becomes a 100% owner of X, the situation is as if
$200 were distributed to A who then purchased all of Ps preferred
stock. On the deemed distribution of $200 to A, $160 will be ordi-
163. In Rev. Rul. 81-91, 1981-1 C.B. 123, the IRS determined that participating, voting,
preferred stock received in an E recapitalization was not "section 306 stock." The IRS iden-
tified stock subject to § 306 as follows:
The potential for a preferred stock bailout exists if the shareholders receive a
pro rata distribution of two classes of stock in a recapitalization when the cor-
poration has earnings and profits, and the stock of one class, because of its
terms, can be disposed of without a surrender by the shareholders of signifi-
cant interests in corporate growth.
Id. at 124. This formulation, however, fails to recognize that no corporate earnings have
been bailed out by a sale. The earnings remain in corporate solution. Moreover, once the
purchaser redeems the newly acquired stock, whether the stock would or would not share in
future corporate growth is irrelevant.
164. See proposed §§ 300(6), (10) supra pp. 15-16, 19.
165. See proposed § 300(7) supra p. 16.
166. Ps preferred stock would continue to be valued at $200.
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nary income.1"7 The other $40 will reduce A's basis in his common
stock from $640 to $600.118 The second aspect of the redemption is
a deemed contribution to capital by A of $200, increasing A's basis
to $800, followed by a redemption of I's stock with a $200 cost
basis, producing no further gain.
In sum, A would recognize $40 of ordinary income on the sale
and an additional $160 of ordinary income on any subsequent re-
demption. A would accumulate 100% of the outstanding stock of
X with a fair market value and basis of $800.119 Because proposed
section 300 prevents bail-outs without special classification of
stock, it would eliminate the definitional and operational problems
that presently plague I.R.C. section 306 and more accurately reflect
the economic realities of a sale by a shareholder of "section 306
stock." Although proposed section 300 cuts back the overreach of
167. After recognizing $40 of ordinary income on the sale to I, A's ratable share of earn-
ings and profits decreases from $200 to $160 which is recognized by proposed § 300(6) on
the deemed distribution.
168. See proposed § 300(7) supra p. 16.
169. Differences between I.R.C. § 306 and proposed § 300 also are apparent when "section
306 stock" is redeemed instead of sold. If the common stock of X Corp. in the textual exam-
ple is held evenly by A and B, each has stock with a fair market value of $500 and a basis of
$400. When X distributes a $100 preferred stock dividend to A and B, no tax consequences
result from the pro rata distribution, and each shareholder's common stock decreases in
value to $400. The preferred is "section 306 stock" under existing I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(A). If X
redeems A's preferred stock in a non-pro rata redemption, I.R.C. § 306(a)(2) would tax him
on $100 ordinary income, even though by redeeming, A has decreased his ownership of X (A
now holds stock valued at $400 and B holds stock worth $500).
Proposed § 300 respects the change in percentage of ownership while recognizing some of
X's distribution constitutes ordinary income. Proposed § 300(4) treats the $100 distribution
on a pro rata basis, giving A and B each $50 of ordinary income pursuant to proposed §
300(6). Proposed § 300(5) then gives B a constructive contribution to capital of $50, raising
his basis by that amount. Simultaneously, A redeems his preferred for $50. A's ownership
after the redemption is decreased by 11.11%. Immediately after the deemed distribution
and prior to the redemption, A owned $450 of stock ($100 preferred and $350 common).
After the redemption, A owned only $400 of common stock. The percentage decrease in his
ownership is $450.
The preferred and common, although separate classes of stock, are considered jointly be-
cause the basis, earnings, and profits attributable to the preferred were derived from the
common. Accordingly, 11.11% of A's ratable share of remaining earnings and profits ($50),
and A's stock basis ($400), are allocable to the stock redeemed. See proposed §§ 300(8), (10)
supra at 17, 19. A has $5.56 ordinary income on the redemption, and the remaining $44.44
received reduces the basis attributable to the redeemed stock to $0. A is left with a basis of
$355.56 in his common stock. In sum, A recognizes $55.56 and B recognizes $50 of ordinary
income, reflecting the fact that A has pulled cash out of X only by weakening his percentage
of ownership.
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I.R.C. section 306 on sales and redemptions of "section 306 stock,"
proposed section 300 would extend the logic behind I.R.C. section
306 to transactions that might not be covered by that provision." '
For example, if A, the sole shareholder of X Corp., sells 10% of his
common stock to I, who has its stock redeemed, under existing law
A effectively has received a distribution from X at a capital gains
rate. 7 1 Proposed section 300, however, assures that A will recog-
nize ordinary income on the sale and on the redemption regardless
of whether common or preferred stock serves as the bail-out
vehicle. 7 12
D. Bootstrap Acquisitions
A shareholder in a closely held corporation who desires to sell
his stock interest may confront a purchaser who is unable or un-
willing to pay the agreed upon fair market value of the stock inter-
est. Often, a transaction can be structured in which cash in the
corporation to be acquired can be distributed to the seller, thereby
reducing the purchaser's cost by the amount of the acquired corpo-
ration's own funds. This bootstrap acquisition can be accomplished
through either a pre-sale dividend to the seller or a partial re-
demption of the seller's stock in conjunction with a sale to the pur-
chaser. 173 Although the techniques may differ, the economic results
170. For a discussion of common stock bail-outs, see Gallagher, Common Stock Bailouts:
A Planning Device for the Close Corporation, 11 TAx AVISER 106 (1980); Lowe, Bailouts:
Their Role in Corporate Planning, 30 TAx L. REv. 357, 411-17 (1975).
171. For an indication of the bail-out potential of common stock, see BRUDNEY & CHIREL-
STEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 461-70 (1979).
172. Under current law, a variety of bail-out mechanisms remain. In Palmer v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974), aff'd on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975), the tax-
payer donated stock in a corporation to a foundation, both of which he owned. The day
after the donation, the corporation agreed to redeem the foundation's stock. The Tax Court
held that the transaction constituted a valid gift to the foundation followed by a redemp-
tion, rather than a nonqualifying redemption by the shareholder that would produce ordi-
nary income followed by a gift to the foundation. In Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, the
IRS approved the Palmer result so long as the donee is not obigated to redeem at the time
the donee receives the gift. Although proposed § 300 would not tax the donor on the initial
gift, the subsequent redemption would be treated as a pro rata distribution to the donor in
accordance with proposed § 300(4), followed by a deemed contribution to capital, thereby
limiting the effectiveness of the bailout.
173. For a general discussion of the bootstrap problem, see Jassy, The Tax Treatment of
Bootstrap Stock Acquisitions: The Redemption Route Vs. The Dividend Route, 87 HA~v. L.
REv. 1459 (1974); Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85
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as indicated in part I of the Article are identical. 174 In the area of
bootstrap acquisitions, however, the present law seriously stumbles
as it awkwardly grasps for a logical principle.17 5 Provided with only
"the now concretized standard of form over substance," courts pre-
dictably have struggled to produce consistent results. 7 6
Considering the redemption line of cases first, precedent directs
that a redemption of a portion of a seller's stock in conjunction
with a sale, which together satisfy the requirements of I.R.C. sec-
tion 302(b), will enjoy capital gains treatment.177 Whether the re-
demption of the selling shareholder's stock will be treated as a div-
idend to the purchaser will depend on whether the purchaser is
relieved of a personal contractual obligation to purchase the re-
deemed stock. 7 s Yet, regardless of whether the purchaser is obli-
YALE L.J. 861 (1976).
174. Cases 1 to 5 supra pp. 3-4 illustrate the economic equivalence of a variety of boot-
strap acquisitions in which the purchaser, an existing 50% shareholder, seeks to end up with
75% ownership of a corporation at no direct cost. In each case, the shift in ownership is
financed by a $1,200 distribution from the acquired corporation. As indicated, existing law
yields a variety of inconsistent tax results. Proposed § 300, however, would recognize the
economic equivalence of each variation. See supra pp. 19-26.
175. Judge Tannenwald reveals his frustration and despair in this area in a recent case:
Once again, we face the issue of whether the redemption of one shareholder by
a corporation constitutes a constructive dividend to the remaining sharehold-
ers. No useful purpose would be served by an extensive discussion of the nu-
merous cases which have dealt with this issue, because each case turns on its
own facts and circumstances.
Daniel T. Jacobs, 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 81,081.
176. Id.
177. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) (redemption met requirements of
I.R.C. § 302(b)(3)); Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223 (IRS will follow Zenz). For a discus-
sion of Zenz as applied to I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) redemptions, see Ted Bates & Co., 1965 T.C.M.
(P-H) 1 65,251; Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113. If the sale and redemption are not made
pursuant to a sufficiently definite plan, Zenz does not apply. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 1084 (1976), afl'd, 592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979); Niedermeyer v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974), af'd per curiam, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1000 (1976).
178. Compare Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) (purchaser taxed when
the acquired corporation discharged the purchaser's purchase money obligation acquired af-
ter the sale but prior to payment) with Edenfield v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 13 (1952) and
Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42 (no dividend to purchaser where no personal obligation
existed to purchase shares redeemed).
In Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958), the court held that assignment by
the purchaser to the corporation of an option to purchase the seller's shares fell on the
Edenfield end of the spectrum. In following Halsey, the IRS endeavored to de-emphasize
the form of the transaction, focusing on the date, if any, when a purchaser is under a pri-
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gated to purchase shares, a redemption by the corporation will
have the same economic consequences.1 9 The focus on the source
of the obligation to purchase is misplaced.
The same exaggerated emphasis on motive and obligation is
more apparent in the dividend line of cases. In Steel Improvement
and Forge Co. v. Commissioner,1 8 0 after a stock purchase contract
had been executed, a dividend was paid to the seller as contem-
plated by the contract. The price paid by the purchaser was not
reduced by the amount of the dividend. The Tax Court found a
dividend to the seller because the purchaser never was obligated to
pay a higher purchase price. I" ' The Sixth Circuit reversed, deter-
mining that beneficial ownership had passed to the purchaser prior
to declaration of the dividend. The dividend was taxed to the pur-
chaser and treated as part of the sales proceeds received by the
seller.
The Tax Court relied upon the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Steel
Improvement and Forge when Waterman Steamship Corp. v.
Commissioner's" was argued. In Waterman Steamship, a corpora-
tion distributed a promissory note to the seller prior to the signing
of a binding purchase contract.""3 Immediately subsequent to the
dividend, the purchaser acquired the seller's stock while providing
funds to the acquired corporation to discharge the promissory
note. Because there was no shift in beneficial interest when the
dividend was declared and paid, the Tax Court held that the seller
was taxable. The Fifth Circuit reversed, treating the distribution
as part of the sales proceeds, in part, because the purchaser's funds
were used to pay the dividend.""
By the time Casner v. Commissioner"8 5 was decided, the Tax
Court thought it understood the circuit court's mandate. The tax-
payer in Casner sought to transfer all his stock in two corporations
mary and unconditional obligation to purchase. See Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 C.B. 920; Rev.
Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42.
179. See BirrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 32, at 1 9.25.
180. 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963).
181. 36 T.C. 265 (1961).
182. 50 T.C. 650 (1968), rev'd, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970).
183. The seller, a corporation, preferred a dividend accompanied by a reduced purchase
price in order to take advantage of the I.R.C. § 243 deduction. 430 F.2d at 1187.
184. The Fifth Circuit ruled that there was no dividend to either party. Id. at 1191-92.
185. 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971).
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to existing shareholders and to third parties. Prior to the execution
of any purchase contract, the corporations paid out pro rata divi-
dends to the extent of the corporations' paid-in capital surplus.'
The IRS, contrary to its position in Waterman Steamship, argued
that the payment was a dividend to the seller. 187 Applying prece-
dent to the facts in Casner, the Tax Court observed the following:
the purchasers never were bound to pay an additional amount
equal to the dividends paid; the dividends were declared and paid
prior to any binding contract; shareholders who were not involved
with the sale or purchase of the stock received dividends; in con-
trast to Waterman Steamship, cash was distributed; and beneficial
ownership, as defined in Steel Improvement and Forge, had not
passed to the purchasers.18 Consequently, the Tax Court con-
cluded that the sellers and other shareholders receiving distribu-
tions should be taxed on the dividends.'8 9 Again, the Tax Court
was reversed. The Fifth Circuit, relying heavily on both Steel Im-
provement and Forge and Waterman Steamship held that the dis-
tributions were taxable to the purchasers as constructive dividends
and then taxable to the seller as sales proceeds. While criticizing
the IRS for taking inconsistent positions in Waterman Steamship
and Casner, the court relied on the parties' intention to accomplish
the sale through an integrated plan as well as the "economic sub-
stance" of the transaction. 90
Commentators and courts have struggled to find reason where
little exists. One suggestion is to conform the dividend line of cases
186. An understanding existed that the stock would be purchased shortly after the divi-
dend distribution at book value adjusted for the declared dividends.
187. Neither the buyers nor the sellers reported dividend income. The sellers viewed the
distribution as part of the purchase price, and the buyers claimed the distributions (even
those received directly by them) were income to the sellers.
188. See Jassy, supra note 173, at 1473.
189. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 535, 541 (1969).
190. 450 F.2d at 398. But see Rev. Rul. 75-493 1975-2 C.B. 109 (the IRS will not follow
Casner).
Most recently in TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980),
the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court in a bootstrap transaction. A dividend in kind of
unwanted portfolio assets, followed by a sale of stock by the controlling corporate share-
holder to a new buyer who promptly infused the acquired corporation with cash and portfo-
lio assets, was ruled a dividend to the seller by the Fifth Circuit. The insertion of assets into
the acquired corporation by the purchaser was not, alone, sufficient to invoke the Waterman
Steamship precedent. 624 F.2d at 1334.
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to the redemption line of cases so that any corporate distribution
to the seller that does not relieve a purchaser's obligation could be
treated as a redemption if the standards of I.R.C. section 302(b)
are met.19 ' Other commentators have suggested that because a div-
idend has no economic substance, certainty and predictability of
result can be achieved only by focusing on the negotiation and the
form of the transaction. 192
Proposed section 300 eliminates the bootstrap problem by giving
all economically identical transactions identical tax results. Pro-
posed section 300 accomplishes this consistency by focusing on the
outcome of the transaction regardless of motive, satisfaction of an
obligation, or distributions by redemption or dividend. The order
of transactions is irrelevant if they conclude identically. To illus-
trate, assume X Corp., with $300 of earnings and profits, is solely
owned by S whose ten shares have a fair market value of $1,000
and a basis of $700. P desires to purchase all of the stock of X, but
has only $700. The options include the following:
Option 1-Payment of a $300 dividend to S followed by a sale to
P of all ten shares for $700, the reduced value of the
stock.
Option 2-Purchase of all ten shares for $1,000 followed by a
dividend to P of $300.
Option 3-Redemption of three shares of stock for $300 fol-
lowed or preceded by a sale of the remaining seven
shares to P for $700.
Under all three options, S will be taxed on $300 of ordinary in-
come. All of the appreciation in his stock is due to X's earnings
and profits. Whether he received those earnings and profits in the
form of a dividend, increased sales price, or redemption, the earn-
ings and profits would not be transformed into capital gains under
proposed section 300. The result in Option 1, mandated by pro-
posed section 300(4), does not hinge on whether beneficial owner-
191. See Jassey, supra note 173, at 1479-82. This approach has been criticized for jeop-
ardizing tax-free reorganization treatment under LR.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) when a dividend is
declared immediately prior to stock-for-stock acquisition. See Kingson, supra note 173, at
867 n.30.
192. See Kingson, supra note 173. See also Ginsburg, Letter, 86 YALE L.J. 798, 804 (1977)
(criticizing part of Kingson's conclusion and suggesting that bootstrap distributions be
treated not as payments in redemption, nor as dividends, but as capital payments).
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ship had passed to the purchaser, 93 on the intention of the par-
ties,1 94 or on whether the actual proceeds of the distribution were
provided by the purchaser. 9 5 As Option 2 illustrates, even when
the dividend is paid directly to P, S still must account for the dis-
tribution of earnings and profits he receives through an enriched
sales price. 196 Option 3, which may produce capital gains under
Zenz v. Quinlivan,19 7 is treated identically to Options I and 2.
Even if P had obligated himself personally to purchase all of S's
stock before shifting part of the obligation to X, P would receive
no dividend income under the proposal.19 8
Proposed section 300 offers the promise of predictability and
logic in an area where uncertainty has caused extensive litigation.
Not only has there been a significant number of litigated cases, but
the focus of the litigation often has been divorced from the sub-
stance of the transaction-that is, the amount and nature of the
income received by the seller.'99
E. Liquidations
The theory behind proposed section 300, that earnings and prof-
its be taxed at ordinary rates whenever extracted from corporate
form, should apply to liquidations as well as to operating distribu-
193. See Steel Improvement and Forge Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963).
194. See Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971).
195. See Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970). If X
had distributed a note to A because earnings and profits had been reinvested, no change
should result. The fact that the cash to discharge the note eventually was provided by P also
would be irrelevant. Regardless of the physical source of the funds, $300 of what S receives
represents the earnings and profits of X Corp.
196. Proposed § 300(5) treats the transaction as if S closes his corporate account and
receives his original $700 of capital in addition to $300 of taxable earnings and profits. Si-
multaneously, P opens his corporate account with the $1,000 purchase price. Because S is
taxed on the sale to the extent of X's earnings and profits, the distribution to P will be a
return of capital under proposed § 300(7), thus reducing P's basis to $700.
197. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
198. Proposed § 300 rejects the judicial reasoning in the line of cases and rulings typified
by Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958) and Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B.
42, under which obligation rather than economics determines the outcome.
199. See, e.g., Daniel T. Jacobs, 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,081; Sullivan v. United States,
363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1967); Wolf v. Commissioner, 357
F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1966). These cases illustrate the preoccupation with determining whose
obligation is discharged by the redeeming corporation.
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tions.200 Existing I.R.C. sections 331(a)(1) and (2), however, pro-
vide for exchange treatment for qualifying liquidations even
though a portion of the distribution may be comprised of corporate
earnings and profits. Predictably, taxpayers flushed with the ex-
citement of turning ordinary income into capital gains have pushed
both the partial and complete liquidation provisions beyond their
limits.
I.R.C. section 346(a)(2) provides that a distribution in redemp-
tion be treated as a partial liquidation if it is "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend." This category of partial liquidations fo-
cuses on "what happens solely at the corporate level by reason of
the assets distributed" or the concept of "corporate contrac-
tion. ' 20 1 This formulation is fundamentally problematic. The "cor-
porate contraction" standard is hopelessly imprecise. Every pro
rata distribution of earnings and profits contracts the corpora-
tion.2  Moreover, the emphasis on corporate motive in determin-
ing the character of a distribution is inconsistent with basic tax
concepts. For instance, in a simple distribution situation, the fact
that a corporation intends to return the taxpayer's original capital
is irrelevant if there are earnings and profits. 20 3 The Code does not
trace; earnings and profits come out first. Similarly, the fact that a
corporation attempts to trace the distribution of funds to capital
invested in a terminated business should be irrelevant if the dis-
tributing corporation has earnings and profits.
Revised Ruling 76-2892o4 illustrates the tracing problem. There,
the IRS ruled that a profitable wholesale appliance distributorship
could distribute the working capital of its terminated retail divi-
sion in partial liquidation under I.R.C. section 346(a)(2). Capital
200. Proposed §§ 300(1) and (3) are intended to cover both partial and complete liquida-
tions that are, in effect, no more than partial or complete redemptions of the stock of all the
shareholders.
201. S. REP. No. 1622,.83d Cong., 2d Sess., 49, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4621, 4680.
202. For criticism of the "corporate contraction" doctrine, see Bittker & Redlich, Corpo-
rate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437, 472-73 (1950); Surrey, Income
Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders: American Law Institute Tax Pro-
ject-American Bar Association Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14 TAX L. REv.
1, 5-13 (1958).
203. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(1).
204. Rev. Rul. 76-289, 1976-2 C.B. 100.
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gains treatment results even though the ruling states explicitly
that "the additional funds invested in the retail division were de-
rived from the profitable operations of the wholesale division."
Noting that whether earnings and profits become working capital
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, the IRS
found the "gradual commitment of the funds" dispositive. °5 Pre-
sumably, if earnings and profits had been transferred to the retail
division immediately prior to the corporate transaction, dividend
treatment would have resulted. Rather than tracing the'distributed
funds, proposed section 300 would look to the corporate distributor
only to determine the amount of earnings and profits. The distri-
bution would then be evaluated at the shareholder level in accor-
dance with the order of receipt for all distributions: first, the allo-
cable earnings and profits; second, return of basis; third, capital
gain.
2 0
6
The stress point in the area of complete liquidations is the liqui-
dation-reincorporation phenomenon by which taxpayers who never
intend to leave the corporate form liquidate and reform solely for
tax reasons.0 7 In its simplest form, the pattern is as follows: X
Corp., with original assets of $1,000 and cash from earnings and
profits of $1,000,000, liquidates. A, the sole shareholder holding
stock with a $1,000 basis, reports a $1,000,000 capital gain.208 The
next day, A contributes his original $1,000 to the New X. If suc-
cessful, A has pulled out earnings and profits at a capital gains
rate. The liquidation-reincorporation pattern also can be used to
obtain a stepped-up basis for inventory or depreciable assets at a
capital gains rate.0 9
205. Id. at 101.
206. See proposed §§ 300(6), (7) supra pp. 15-16.
207. See generally BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 32, at 1 11.05, 14.54.
208. See I.R.C. § 331. X has no gain on the liquidation under I.R.C. § 336. A has no
further gain on reincorporation if the transfer qualifies under I.R.C. § 351. An alternative
method of reaching the same result is for the liquidating corporation to transfer its operat-
ing assets to a new corporation controlled by the same shareholders, for cash or other prop-
erty, followed by a liquidation.
209. I.R.C. § 334(a) gives shareholders a fair market basis on a liquidation. Although
LR.C. §§ 47(a)(1), 1245, and 1250 override § 336, a low corporate tax rate may inspire a
liquidation-reincorporation involving depreciable property when the corporation expects to
be in a higher bracket in the future. Also, because I.R.C. § 1250 does not recapture straight-
line depreciation, liquidation-reincorporation can renew basis at no cost of recapture. Re-
capture aside, any appreciation in depreciable property can be extracted at capital gains
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With admirable persistence, the IRS has fought to reclassify the
liquidation-reincorporation device as a reorganization in which tax-
able boot is distributed,21 0 or to treat the transactions as a "sham"
giving rise to dividend treatment under I.R.C. section 301.211 In
spite of the IRS's efforts, reclassification has not always been pos-
sible, even when appropriate. For instance, failure to prove either
sufficient continuity of shareholders' proprietary interest in both
the liquidating and new corporation or continuity-of-business en-
terprise will defeat reorganization treatment.212
In Commissioner v. Berghash,2 3 Berghash, who owned virtually
100% of Delavan-Bailey, the liquidating corporation, decided to
transfer 50% control to Lettman, an irreplaceable employee.214
Delavan-Bailey held operating assets valued at $121,000. Lettman,
however, had only $25,000. To achieve their goal, Berghash and
Lettman entered into an agreement providing a sale of Delavan-
Bailey's operating assets to a new corporation, Dorn's, in exchange
for 100 shares of Dorn's common stock valued at $25,000 and a
promissory note for $96,101.64. At the same time, Lettman pur-
chased 100 shares of Dorn's common stock for $25,000. Following
the sale, Delavan-Bailey liquidated, distributing to Berghash the
100 shares of Dorn's stock, the promissory note, and $49,313.17 in
cash. Berghash reported a capital gain of $168,203.35.21 5 Delavan-
Bailey, relying on I.R.C. section 337, reported no gain.21 6
In filing its notice of deficiency, the IRS argued that the distri-
rates and give the shareholder a stepped-up basis.
210. When the liquidating corporation transfers assets to the new corporation through
shareholder-conduits, reclassification as a reorganization governed by I.R.C. § 368(a) and
related provisions, embodies the spirit of Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331
(1945). For a discussion of reclassification as D reorganization, see, e.g., Moffatt v. Commis-
sioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967); Reef Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966); James Armour v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
211. See Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.301-1(1), 1.331-1(c); Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62.
212. Similarly, the IRS's attempts to treat liquidation-reincorporations as "shams" or as
dividends severable from reorganizations have met with limited success. See BrrrKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 32, at 11.05 n.41.
213. 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
214. Berghash owned 99% and his wife owned 1% of the outstanding stock. 361 F.2d at
258-59.
215. The fair market value of the distributi6n was $170,414.81, and Berghash had a
$2,211.46 stock basis. Id. at 259.
216. The unrecognized gain on the sale was $46,218.24. Id.
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bution received by Berghash was in the nature of a dividend to the
extent of Delavan-Bailey's $122,050.11 of earnings and profits be-
cause the transaction lacked economic substance or, alternatively,
constituted a D or F reorganization. Both the Tax Court and the
Second Circuit determined that the transfer was founded upon a
bona fide business purpose, the retention of a valuable employee.
Moreover, because Berghash, a 100% owner of Delavan-Bailey,
was only a 50% owner of Dorn's, there was insufficient continuity
of shareholder interest to justify reorganization treatment.21 7 The
result was a bail-out of earnings and profits at a capital gain rate.
The result in Berghash is another victory of form over sub-
stance. The economic result is identical to the direct distribution
of a $96,101.64 promissory note and $49,313.17 in cash which
would reduce the value of Delavan-Bailey to $25,000. If Lettman
then purchases $25,000 of new stock, he and Berghash would be
50% owners. Under this formulation, Berghash clearly would have
ordinary income on the distribution to the extent of earnings and
profits. The percentage of stock purchased by Lettman is irrele-
vant in determining the tax consequences to Berghash on the dis-
tribution; yet, the percentage of stock purchased was the basis of
the decision in Berghash.218 Simply stated, Delavan-Bailey earned
$122,050.11 and distributed that amount and more. Whether the
distribution was nominally part of a reorganization, part of a sale
and liquidation, or simply a distribution accompanied by a stock
purchase should have no special tax consequences when the end
result is identical.
Proposed section 300(6) guarantees ordinary income treatment,
regardless of the form, to the extent of the distributing corpora-
217. 43 T.C. 743, 754 (1965).
218. Interestingly, the Tax Court rejected application of the attribution rules of I.R.C. "
318 even though Berghash had an option to purchase Lettman's stock in Dorn's. 43 T.C. at
757.
For an example of the Code's misdirected concern with continuity at the corporate level,
see Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965). In Pridemark, the court
focused on the one-year period between liquidation and reincorporation and concluded that
reincorporation treatment was inappropriate. As a result, I.R.C. § 331 gave the shareholder
capital gains treatment in spite of ample earnings and profits. To the extent that earnings
and profits passed out of corporate solution to the shareholder, ordinary income should have
resulted regardless of characterizations of the earnings and profits as liquidation or reorgan-
ization distribution.
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tion's earnings and profits. This change would curtail the liquida-
tion-reincorporation device as a means of pulling out ordinary in-
come at capital gains and eliminate the corporate earnings and
profits account. Some other liquidation-reincorporation advan-
tages, however, would remain. Proposed section 300 does not ad-
dress the use of reincorporation to obtain a stepped-up basis when
reorganization analysis would carry over the original basis. Nor
does proposed section 300 address the availability of I.R.C. section
337, which can eliminate a corporate tax when liquidation is in-
volved, but is not available if a sale is made pursuant to a reorgani-
zation. For corporations with earnings and profits, however, at-
tempted reincorporations to take advantage of basis adjustments
would be accomplished at an ordinary income cost, effectively
curbing the appeal of converting ordinary income to capital gains.
A problem related to the reincorporation device is the collapsible
corporation, currently addressed by I.R.C. section 341.219 To illus-
trate, Builder with $10,000 forms X Corp. which constructs (using
borrowed funds), but does not sell, houses with a fair market value
of $1,000,000. In the absence of a remedial provision, Builder liqui-
dates, recognizing a $990,000 capital gain and receiving a
$1,000,000 stepped-up basis. Builder then can sell the ordinary
income property without recognizing further gain or, if the con-
tinuity-of-business problems are surmounted, reincorporate and
have the new corporation execute the sales. Either method allows
Builder to pull out potential ordinary income at capital gains rates
in order to step up basis.
Congressional response to collapsible corporations came in the
form of I.R.C. section 341, a temple to obfuscation, the clarity of
which is typified by the more than 300 word first sentence of I.R.C.
section 341(e). The progenitors of I.R.C. section 341 have been
identified as the capital gains preference and the General Utili-
ties220 rule that permit corporations to distribute appreciated
property free of corporate income tax and with a stepped-up ba-
sis. 221 The reform efforts aimed at simplifying I.R.C. section 341
219. For a complete discussion of the area, see Ginsburg, Collapsible Corpora-
tions-Revisiting an Old Misfortune, 33 TAX L. REv. 309 (1978).
220. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
221. See Ginsburg, supra note 212, at 325. The rule from General Utilities is embodied in
I.R.C. §§ 311 and 336 which operate along with §§ 337 and 334(b)(2) to provide a step-up in
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have focused on the more palatable disposition of the General
Utilities rule as opposed to the capital gains privilege.22
Proposed section 300 would not require the complete undermin-
ing of the General Utilities principle, in part, because the proposal
cuts back on the definition of capital gains. Instead, to mitigate the
problem, proposed section 300 requires an expansion of I.R.C. sec-
tion 312(b) creating a corporate earnings and profits account equal
to the value of any stock of appreciated inventory distributed in a
redemption or liquidation. Once an earnings and profits account is
created, Builder, in the example above, will have ordinary income
on the distribution under proposed section 300(6).
To nullify completely the collapsible corporation incentive, any
expansion or adaptation of the section 312(b) principle also must
apply to stock sales.223 In the example above, Builder might just as
conveniently have sold his stock to a third party, reporting a
$990,000 capital gain in the absence of a remedial provision.224 Be-
cause Builder's stock is only worth $1,000,000 due to appreciated
inventory in corporate solution, he should report the appreciation
as ordinary income on the sale of his stock. To accomplish this,
appreciated inventory must be considered to increase the earnings
and profits of a corporation for purposes of any stock sale.225 More-
over, if Builder's corporation does not own appreciated inventory
directly, but rather is a shell corporation owning stock in a corpo-
ration holding only appreciated inventory, earnings and profits
must be increased to the extent that appreciated stock owned by
the shell is due to appreciated inventory.226 If Builder liquidates
basis at no corporate tax cost.
222. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., (Lewis) A Proposed
New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liquidations, 3 TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM 1643 (Comm. Print 1959); FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT ON SUBCHAPTER
C-CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1977).
223. I.R.C. § 312(b), which applies only to distributions, is a compromise provision. Sec-
tion 312(b) does not tax a distributing corporation on appreciated inventory, but § 312(b)
insures that earnings and profits will be sufficient to provide an individual shareholder with
ordinary income at least equal to the appreciation before obtaining a fair market value basis
under I.R.C. § 301(d).
224. If the purchaser liquidated, there would be no gain, and the purchaser, if an individ-
ual, would have a stepped-up basis under I.R.C. § 334(a).
225. Proposed §§ 300(5) and (6) will then treat any sales proceeds as ordinary income to
the extent of the earnings and profits.
226. Similarly, if A owns X Corp. which holds appreciated stock in Y Corp. which has
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the shell or sells his stock in the shell corporation, ordinary income
will result to the extent of the enriched earnings and profits
account.
Tracing the earnings and profits attributable to each stock hold-
ing of a corporation presents a formidable administrative task.
This task is particularly burdensome in the case of a corporate
chain, for example, where X Corp. owns shares in Y Corp. which
owns shares in Z Corp. and so forth. Application of a de minimus
rule here still could sour the appeal of collapsible corporations
without being unworkable. I.R.C. section 341(d)(2) presently pro-
tects a shareholder from collapsible treatment if 70% or less of the
gain on a liquidation, sale, or distribution is traceable to collapsible
property.227 The 70% measure is generous in permitting collapsi-
bility. Many of the potential administrative problems probably
could be avoided if 25% or 30% were used as a measure. A worka-
ble de minimus rule might be structured around the following
guidelines: if 30% or more of the fair market value of a corporation
is a result of property that would produce ordinary income if sold,
earnings and profits of the corporation shall include any net appre-
ciation in such property.2 8
F. Accumulated Earnings and Undistributed Income
Whether adoption of the proposed section 300 framework would
have any effect on corporations improperly accumulating income
or on those functioning as personal holding companies is conjec-
tural. The accumulated earnings and the personal holding com-
pany tax provisions address the misuse of a corporate form to
shield income from individual tax rates that exceed corporate
rates. 2  To remove the earnings from corporate solution, a share-
turned the appreciated inventory into earnings and profits, a sale of the X Corp. stock or a
liquidation of X should be evaluated by taking into account the earnings and profits inher-
ent in the appreciated Y Corp. stock.
227. Tress. Reg. § 1.3 4 1-4(c)( 2 ) measures the gain attributable to the collapsible property
by determining the difference between the gain recognized by the shareholder and the gain
that would have been recognized if the collapsible property had not been purchased or
produced.
228. In conjunction with proposed § 300, this framework would cover the ownership by a
corporation of stock in another corporation either with existing earnings and profits or with
appreciated inventory. See supra note 226.
229. For a discussion of the accumulated earnings tax, see Cunningham, More Than You
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holder may attempt to sell stock, transfer it to his heirs at death,
or exchange it for publicly held stock in a reorganization. Proposed
section 300 would cause a shareholder to report ordinary income
on any stock sale to the extent of earnings and profits, and would
produce ordinary income on a sale of stock by a shareholder's
heirs.23 0 Because proposed section 300 curtails the opportunities to
transform corporate earnings into capital gains, the accumulated
earnings and personal holding tax provisions no longer may be
needed. Even if a taxpayer could not escape eventual ordinary in-
come treatment to himself or to his heirs, however, deferral of
taxes or the hope for a change in the law still might spur the type
of corporate accumulations that I.R.C. sections 531 and 541 were
meant to address.
Assuming that the accumulated earnings tax remains in place,
proposed section 300 still would have a salutary effect. Under ex-
isting law it is possible for the IRS successfully to impose the accu-
mulated earnings tax on a corporation with no earnings for the
year or years in question.231 For example, X Corp. formed in 1960
accumulates $1,000,000 of earnings and profits by December 31,
1969. There are no further accumulations during the 1970's or in
1980. In 1981 X earns $500,000, but distributes all of the earnings
in a redemption qualifying for capital gains treatment under I.R.C.
section 302.252 I.R.C. section 532(a) applies the accumulated earn-
ings tax to a corporation formed or availed of for the purpose of
avoiding income taxes "by permitting earnings and profits to accu-
Ever Wanted to Know About the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 6 J. CoRP. TAX'N 187 (1979);
Libin, Personal Holding Companies and the Revenue Act of 1964, 63 MICH. L. REv. 421
(1965).
230. Even though I.R.C. § 1014 provides a step-up in basis at death, it has no effect on
the corporate earnings and profits account. On any sale by an heir, proposed § 300 would
produce ordinary income to the extent of the allocable portion of earnings and profits.
There may also be a capital loss because the heir's basis has been stepped up. See supra
note 28.
231. See Lamark Shipping Agency, 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 81,284; GPD, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C. 480 (1973), rev'd, 508 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1974); Ostendorf-Morris Co. v.
United States, 26 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5369 (N.D. Ohio 1968). See generally Rudolph, Stock
Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings Tax-An Update, 4 J. CoRP. TAX'N 101
(1977).
232. The charge against the earnings and profits account as a result of a redemption is
calculated under the authority of Helvering v. Jarvis, 123 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1941) and Rev.
Rul. 79-376, 1979-2 C.B. 133. See I.R.C. § 312(e).
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mulate instead of being divided or distributed." Once the tax is
applicable, however, the tax base is "accumulated taxable income,"
or basically a current earnings figure with some adjustments then
diminished by dividends but not by non-pro rata stock redemp-
tions.2"' The battleline thus is drawn. Taxpayer argues that it did
not permit earnings to accumulate for the year in question. The
IRS argues that current accumulation is unnecessary if there are
accumulated earnings and profits and the requisite tax avoidance
motive. Both positions are subject to criticism. Under the tax-
payer's analysis, $.01 of current earnings and profits is enough to
trigger the tax on the total $500,000 accumulated taxable income.
On the other hand, the IRS is attempting to tax accumulated earn-
ings in a year when there are no accumulated earnings.
At the heart of the problem lies the favored treatment given to
reinvested earnings on a redemption. In the example above, if
$500,000 had been distributed as an ordinary income dividend, no
accumulated earnings tax problems would have arisen. However,
when the corporation distributes its current earnings with only a
capital gains toll charge to the shareholders, the Code shows signs
of inconsistency. Clearly, some of the redemption proceeds origi-
nate from and should be charged to the earnings and profits ac-
count, and yet the accumulated earnings provision tends to force
reasonable levels of current distributions, taxable at ordinary in-
come rates.
2 35
The incompatability of the accumulated earnings concept and
redemptions would disappear with the enactment of proposed sec-
tion 300. The proposal forces redeeming shareholders to treat as
ordinary income that portion of earnings and profits attributable
233. See I.R.C. § 531 for imposition of the penalty on accumulated taxable income. I.R.C.
§ 535 defines accumulated taxable income. I.R.C. §§ 561-565 define the dividends-paid de-
duction. I.R.C. § 562(c) eliminates non-pro rata stock redemptions from the dividends-paid
deduction.
234. The IRS prevailed in GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1974), in
which the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court. In Lamark Shipping Agency, 1981 T.C.M.
(P-H) 1 81,284, the Tax Court, apparently unconvinced by the Sixth Circuit, noted the
"fairly nettlesome legal issue," but declined to decide the issue because neither party raised
it. 1981 T.C.M. at 974-81.
235. The inconsistencies of the Code are evident in I.R.C. §§ 312(a) and (e), which reduce
earnings and profits on a redemption, and I.R.C. § 562(c), which prohibits any decrease in
the accumulated earnings tax base for non-pro rata redemptions.
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to the stock redeemed. Moreover, nonredeeming shareholders also
will have ordinary income treatment under proposed section
300(4). Because any distributed earnings and profits will produce
ordinary income to the shareholders, there is no need to apply the
accumulated earnings tax provision when all of the earnings and
profits for the years in question have been distributed.2 e
G. Reorganizations
Under existing law, it is often difficult to determine when a reor-
ganization has taken place and when-a corporation simply has dis-
tributed a taxable stock dividend. For example, a recapitalization
in which some shareholders exchange some or all of their common
stock for preferred is identical to a taxable stock dividend de-
scribed in I.R.C. section 305(b)(3) when some common sharehold-
ers receive common and others receive preferred. Whether the ex-
change is taxable may turn on the frequency of the event. If the
exchange is an isolated transaction that looks like a recapitaliza-
tion, tax-free treatment will result; if the exchange is pursuant to a
periodic plan to increase certain shareholders' proportionate inter-
ests, the recapitalization may be treated as a constructive distribu-
tion in accordance with I.R.C. section 305(c), subject to tax under
section 305(b).2 87
In Revenue Ruling 75-93238 the IRS pushed this questionable
distinction even further. There, the corporation had two classes of
common stock outstanding with equal voting rights. The Class A
common with a $2.00 par value and the Class B common with a
236. To the extent that application of the accumulated earnings tax is diminished, courts
would no longer have to wrestle with whether the hypothetical accumulated earnings (undi-
minished by the redemption) exceeded a taxpayer's reasonable business needs for the year
or years in question. See I.R.C. §§ 533, 537. Compare, e.g., Mountain State Steel Foundries
v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960) (redemption of a dissenting minority share-
holder held reasonable) with Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958) (redemption of majority shareholder held not
reasonable).
237. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7(c). The only legislative explanation of the difference is a
disclaimer made by Senator Long during the floor debate of I.R.C. § 305 of any intent to tax
classic recapitalizations in which older, retiring shareholders exchange common for pre-
ferred, while younger shareholders, active in the business, increase their percentage of com-
mon. 115 CONG. REc. 37,902 (1969). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Ex. 12.
238. Rev. Rul. 75-93, 1975-1 C.B. 101.
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$.20 par value shared in dividends and liquidating distributions in
a 10:1 ratio, commensurate with the par values. The corporation
recapitalized for valid business reasons in accordance with I.R.C.
section 368(a)(1)(E), with Class B shareholders receiving one Class
A share for every seven instead of ten Class B shares. The result
was an increase in the former Class B shareholders' proportionate
interests in the assets and earnings of the corporation. Stressing
the isolated nature of the transaction, the I.R.S. held the transac-
tion not reachable by I.R.C. section 305(b). 3 9
Although the IRS is content to let isolated disproportionate re-
capitalizations qualify for tax-free treatment, certain proportionate
recapitalizations cause tax consequences when a shareholder re-
ceives stock in discharge of preferred arrearages.24 To illustrate: X
Corp. has two classes of stock outstanding-ten shares of $100 par
5% cumulative preferred, four years in dividend arrears, and ten
shares of common stock. X Corp. has $2,200 of assets including
$200 of earnings and profits. If X Corp. recapitalizes by issuing a
new class of preferred worth $120 for each share of the old pre-
ferred, I.R.C. sections 305(c) and (b)(4) will tax the preferred
shareholders on $20 per share;24 1 yet, there have been no propor-
tionate changes. Even though new pieces of paper have replaced
old pieces, no corporate funds have been distributed and the tax-
payers remain in their same relative positions. The preferred
shareholders who had a claim for each share of stock on $100 of
X's assets plus $20 for the dividend arrearages after the recapitali-
zation hold stock certificates worth $120 per share. The common
shareholders who, prior to the recapitalization, held stock worth
$100 per share continue to do so.
Proposed section 300 analyzes the taxability of reorganizations
in the same manner as other corporate distributions-by focusing
on proportionate changes among shareholders. When proportion-
ate interests change, as in Revenue Ruling 75-93, proposed section
300(4) would tax those shareholders whose interests are enhanced.
239. The IRS analogized an isolated recapitalization to an isolated redemption, which
does not acti'ate I.R.C. § 305(b) in spite of the increased proportionate interests in the
assets, earnings, and profits of the corporation by the nonredeeming shareholders. See
Tress. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Exs. 10, 11, 13.
240. See Tress. Regs. §§ 1.368-2(e)(5), 1.305-7(c).
241. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d), Exs. 1, 2.
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When proportionate interests remain constant, as in the recapitali-
zation of stock arrearages, proposed section 300(4) would produce
no tax consequences.
The adoption of proposed section 300 would impact the current
reorganization provisions in other ways as well. A reorganization
may offer an opportunity to dilute a large earnings and profits ac-
count among a number of shareholders, thereby decreasing the
amount of ordinary income on the shareholders' eventual sale of
the acquired stock. For example, A, sole shareholder of X Corp.
with $500,000 of earnings and profits, exchanges his stock for the
stock of Y with no earnings and profits and forty-nine sharehold-
ers. The exchange qualifies as a B reorganization pursuant to
I.R.C. section 368(a)(1)(B). Unless the earnings and profits account
follows A, he will escape recognizing $490,000 on any eventual sale
of Y stock while the Y shareholders each would have to account for
$10,000 of ordinary income on any sale of their stock. In light of
this potential bail-out, it may be advisable to force an acquiring
shareholder in a reorganization to carry over his share of the ac-
quired corporation's earnings and profits in his new stock. The ar-
gument for the carry over is strengthened by the fact that the ac-
quiring shareholder does not have to share in the earnings and
profits of the acquiring corporation that were amassed prior to the
organization.242
The allocation of earnings and profits in a reorganization is a
problem related to the treatment of boot by a shareholder. I.R.C.
section 356(a)(1) provides for the recognition of any boot received
to the extent of the shareholder's gain. I.R.C. section 356(a)(2)
characterizes any gain recognized as ordinary income to the extent
of a shareholder's ratable share of earnings and profits, if the ex-
change has the "effect of the distribution of a dividend. ' 243 Based
on dicta in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford,244 the IRS initially
242. See proposed § 300(9) supra p. 18.
243. For a discussion of the amount and nature of gain recognized in a tax-free reorgani-
zation, see Golub, "Boot" in Reorganizations-The Dividend Equivalency Test of Section
356(a) (2), 58TAxEs 904 (1980); Levin, Adess & McGaffey, Boot Distributions in Corporate
Reorganizations-Determination of Dividend Equivalency, 30 TAx LAW. 287 (1977);
Samansky, Taxation of Nonqualifying Property Distributed in Reorganizations, 31 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1980).
244. 325 U.S. 283 (1945). The Court's expansive language in Bedford was not necessary to
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opted to treat boot as a dividend to the extent of the distributing
corporation's earnings and profits.245 This "automatic dividend"
rule eventually was eroded, however, leaving the IRS and the
courts with I.R.C. sections 302 and 346 as standards for judging
the "effect" of an exchange.246 In applying these standards, some
confusion existed about whether to evaluate the effect of a distri-
bution on a shareholder's stock ownership as though the redemp-
tion occurred before or after the reorganization.4 In Revenue Rul-
ing 75-83, the IRS ruled that the transaction is a hypothetical
redemption of the acquired corporation's stock.248
Proposed section 300 does not attempt to resolve the timing of
the redemption analysis, but the receipt of boot in reorganizations
generally is altered by the proposal to the same extent as redemp-
tion treatment. The dividend within gain concept of I.R.C. section
356(a)(1) would give way to a basic concept under proposed section
300: any distribution will produce ordinary income to the extent of
the applicable measure of earnings and profits.249 To the extent
that the distribution is pro rata to all shareholders of the acquired
corporation, the distribution will be a dividend as measured by
each shareholder's ratable share of earnings and profits.250 If boot
find dividend treatment when a distribution of cash during a recapitalization served to dis-
charge preferred dividend arrearages.
245. See Rev. Rul. 56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191; Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747,
750 (2d Cir. 1956).
246. See Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 832 (1958) (IRS successfully argued against automatic dividend rule for corporate
shareholder); Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118 (formal abandonment of automatic dividend
rule). For application of the principles of I.R.C. §§ 302 and 346, see Wright v. United States,
482 F.2d 600, 607 (8th Cir. 1973); King Enterprises v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 518 (Ct.
Cl. 1969); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 798 (Ct. Cl. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
875 (1959); Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
247. Compare Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973) (treating distribution
as post-merger redemption qualifying under I.R.C. § 302(a)) with Shimberg v. United
States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (treating distribution
as pre-merger redemption). See generally Samansky, supra note 243, at 23-28.
248. Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112. See also Sellers v. United States, 615 F.2d 1066
(5th Cir. 1980); General Housewares v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056, 1065-66 (5th Cir.
1980); Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978).
249. See FEDERAL INcoME TAX PROJECT ON SUBcHAPTER C-CRoRATE AcQuIsMoNs
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1977), which provides for dividend treatment in appropriate circum-
stances regardless of gain.
250. See proposed § 300(6) supra p. 15.
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is received in a non-pro rata distribution, the distribution, in ac-
cordance with existing law, will be treated as a redemption that
may produce both ordinary income and capital gains
consequences. 51
To illustrate: A and B are the sole shareholders of X Corp. with
$120,000 of earnings and profits. Each owns 100 shares with a basis
of $30,000 and a fair market value of $120,000. X Corp. and Y
Corp., a widely held public corporation, merge in accordance with
I.R.C. section 368(a)(1)(A) with A and B each becoming less than
1% shareholders of Y. In the reorganization, A receives 100 shares
or $120,000 of Y Corp. stock in exchange for his X stock, and B
receives fifty shares or $60,000 of Y Corp. stock and $60,000 in
cash. Proposed section 300 treats the redemption as a distribution
followed by a simultaneous contribution to capital and a redemp-
tion. Proposed section 300(4) treats the $60,000 as pro rata distri-
butions of $30,000 to A and B which are taxed as ordinary income
to the extent of the allocable earnings and profits.252 B, whose
stock in X Corp. was worth $90,000 after the deemed distribution
but prior to the redemption, owns $60,000 of stock after the re-
demption. Accordingly, because B has exchanged one-third of his
stock interest in a taxable transaction, $10,000 of basis and $10,000
of earnings and profits are allocable to the redemption.25 3 A raises
his basis in the Y stock by $30,000, the deemed contribution to
capital under proposed-section 300(5), and B recognizes an addi-
251. See proposed §§ 300(6), (7) supra pp. 15-16. Arguably, to the extent that the stock of
the acquired corporation remains outstanding after the reorganization (e.g., a B reorganiza-
tion), the receipt of boot should be treated as sale proceeds. Treatment of boot as sales
proceeds rather than redemption proceeds might affect the allocation of earnings and profits
under proposed § 300(10). For ease of administration, perhaps boot should be treated as
redemption proceeds in all reorganizations. See generally Golub, supra note 243 (arguing
for sales treatment rather than redemption treatment for any boot received in an acquisitive
reorganization).
252. See proposed §§ 300(6), (9) supra pp. 15, 18. To the extent that the acquiring corpo-
ration owns the acquired corporation, or both are commonly owned by the shareholder re-
ceiving boot, the earnings and profits of both corporations should be used as a measure. See
the discussion of existing I.R.C. § 304 supra pp. 45-49. For a case using the earnings and
profits of both the acquiring and acquired corporations, see Davant v. United States, 366
F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
253. See proposed § 300(8) supra p. 17 (basis allocation = $30,000 X 33.33% = $10,000)
and proposed § 300(10) supra p. 19 (earnings and profits allocation = $30,000 X 33.33%
$10,000).
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tional $10,000 of ordinary income and $10,000 of capital gain on
the redemption aspect, leaving him with a $20,000 basis in his Y
stock.2 5 4 A and B would each carry over his ratable share of earn-
ings and profits to the Y stock. 5 The effect, then, of proposed
section 300 on the reorganization provisions is only as significant
as its effect on dividends and redemptions in general. The proposal
does not address independently current reorganization treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The genesis of proposed section 300 lies in the inconsistent
treatment of a corporation's earnings and profits depending on
whether they are distributed or reinvested with shareholders reap-
ing their benefit through sale or redemption. By creating a tax-
neutral framework within which earnings and profits are taxed as
ordinary income regardless of their mode of exit from the corpora-
tion, proposed section 300 would provide identical tax treatment
for identical economic results. The virtues of the proposal include
a consistency that would allow transactions to be planned around
business rather than tax considerations. Existing provisions and
doctrines that fester with complexity and ambiguity, for example,
I.R.C. section 306 or bootstrap acquisitions, would no longer be
needed to patch up the existing system where the leak of earnings
and profits into the capital gains receptacle becomes too pro-
nounced. Corporations that previously had retained earnings for
eventual transformation into capital gains might be more inclined
to distribute them. Because the earnings will be taxed as ordinary
income whether realized by sale, redemption, or liquidation, distri-
bution on a current basis might avoid any bunching problem. If
the proposal resulted in a tendency towards more current distribu-
tion, the result, arguably, would be less economic distortion be-
cause investors would be free to pursue investments with the best
return.256 Whether the proposal would create a lock-in effect due
to the ordinary income potential on a sale of stock is speculative.
Incentive exists not to wait to sell as the unrealized ordinary in-
come in stock increases and bunching becomes more significant.
254. See proposed §§ 300(6), (7) supra pp. 15-16.
255. A would carry over $30,000 of earnings and profits, and B would carry over $20,000.
256. See PECHMAN, supra note 26, at 146; POSNER, supra note 29, at 378.
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Yet, the promise of a step-up in basis at death perhaps becomes
more urgent as the capital gains advantage is weakened. 257
Admittedly, implementation of proposed section 300 is not prob-
lem free. Aside from potential lock-in incentive, the unrealized or-
dinary income in a share of stock arising from reinvested earnings
over a period of years creates a potential bunching problem, forc-
ing shareholders into higher brackets. To the extent shareholders
do not compel current distributions or do not sell their stock on a
current basis, the bunching represents shareholder choice. More-
over, the income averaging provisions of I.R.C. sections 1301 to
1305 can relieve the problem. Perhaps the most significant prob-
lem arising out of the proposal is its heavy emphasis on valuation
as well as earnings and profits allocation. The problems of allocat-
ing earnings and profits among stock classes and accounting for the
appropriate measure of earnings and profits on each sale may re-
quire new reporting and accounting requirements by corporations.
Perhaps the enactment of a de minimus rule could soften the blow.
In spite of the difficulties, proposed section 300's emphasis on val-
uation and the economic effect of transactions rather than on mo-
tive or other qualitative judgments as to form, or on the arbitrary
judgments of provisions such as I.R.C. sections 302 and 305, is
more appropriate for judicial resolution.
If, after weighing the pros and cons of a system along the lines of
proposed section 300, the scale tips toward rejection, perhaps an
alternative solution could address the disparity in the treatment of
reinvested earnings. Rather than conforming the treatment of sale
or redemptions to the treatment of dividends with respect to the
earnings component, all dividends might be given capital gains
treatment. This alternative solution, like proposed section 300,
would have the advantage of uniformity which is sadly lacking
under the Code's existing mongrel provisions.
257. As discussed supra note 28, stock inherited after death would have an unrealized
ordinary income component, although the step-up in basis might provide an offsetting capi-
tal loss on a sale subject to the limitations of I.R.C. §§ 1211 and 1212. If I.R.C. § 1014 were
amended to eliminate a step-up to the extent of the stock's allocable earnings and profits, it
is unclear how the lock-in effect might be altered. See PECHMAN, supra note 26, at 137.
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APPENIX
PROPOSED SECTION 300
(1) The term "distribution" means a payment of property with
respect to or in redemption of the corporation's stock.
(2) The term "property" includes money, securities, and stock in
the corporation making the distribution, or rights to acquire
such stock.
(3) The term "redemption" means the acquisition by a corpora-
tion of its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property,
whether the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or held as
treasury stock.
(4) Any actual distribution with respect to a class of stock is
deemed to be pro rata to the shareholders holding such stock.
Any actual distribution in redemption of a class of stock is
deemed to be pro rata to the shareholders holding such stock
or a less preferred class of stock to the extent that the value
of such shareholders' stock increases as a result of the surren-
der of shares. Distributions of the distributing corporation's
own stock shall have no tax consequences unless the distribu-
tion increases the proportionate interests of the receiving
shareholders in the assets or earnings and profits of the
corporation.
(5) Any transfer of stock by sale or exchange shall be treated as a
redemption and a simultaneous purchase from the corpora-
tion. Any transfer of stock by redemption shall be treated as a
redemption and a simultaneous contribution to capital of the
corporation by the remaining shareholders both in the
amount of the deemed distribution.
(6) On any distribution, a shareholder shall treat as ordinary in-
come any proceeds to the extent of his ratable share of earn-
ings and profits. On any transfer by sale, exchange, or re-
demption, a shareholder shall treat as ordinary income any
proceeds to the extent of his ratable share of earnings and
profits attributable to the stock transferred.
(7) Any amounts distributed in excess of a shareholder's ratable
share of earnings and profits shall first be applied against a
shareholder's basis in his stock (but not in excess of basis al-
locable to any stock transferred), and then be treated as gain
1982]
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from the sale or exchange of property.
(8) In determining gain on a transfer, the basis of stock trans-
ferred equals the product of a shareholder's basis in the class
of stock transferred and the percentage decrease in the share-
holder's stock ownership of that class as a result of the
transfer.
(9) A shareholder's ratable share of earnings and profits equals
the sum for all years of the product of the current earnings
and profits allocable to any class of stock on which a distribu-
tion is made and the shareholder's percentage of stock owner-
ship of such class on January 1 of the year.
(10) The term "ratable share of earnings and profits attributable
to the stock transferred" means the product of the share-
holder's ratable share of earnings and profits and the per-
centage decrease in the shareholder's stock ownership in the
class of stock transferred as a result of the transfer.
